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Abstract
Widespread use of fully autonomous vehicles is near. However, the desire for a
human to maintain control, even if limited, of a vehicle will likely never fully subside.
Protocols to safely and efficiently manage reservation-based intersections with a mix-
ture of fully autonomous, semi-autonomous, and non-autonomous vehicles exist such
as AIM, SemiAIM, and H-AIM. Missing from these protocols is persistent human
control of semi-autonomous vehicles in approaching and navigating autonomous in-
tersections without the use of traditional signals. This thesis offers a proof-of-concept
of a reservation-based protocol with necessary extensions required for human control
in semi-autonomous vehicles. Desired is a protocol that maintains the benefits in
efficiency of a fully autonomous environment, such as AIM, while allowing persistent
human control of a vehicle. Proposed are possible feedback mechanisms for human
response such as displays detailing intersection arrival time, goal velocity, lane keep-
ing assistance, and other warnings. Also developed is a synthetic environment able to
demonstrate cyber attacks, their mitigations, and aid in designing a protocol intro-
ducing persistent human control. The AFTR Burner three-dimensional virtual world
offers the ability to model this physics based environment in a highly predictable and
realistic manner. The reservation-based protocol used in the synthetic environment
is first verified and validated against both an established reservation-based protocol,
such as AIM, and also use case scenarios to determine if the expected behavior is
exhibited. Preliminary observations suggest that persistent human control is a possi-
bility among reservation-based autonomous intersections, but further research must
be done to determine its viability.
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MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF CYBER ATTACKS AND HUMAN CONTROL
IN AN AUTONOMOUS INTERSECTION
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
The time when vehicles communicate with each other and infrastructure is fast
approaching. In fact, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications comes standard on
Cadillac’s 2017 CTS [1]. Modern infrastructure will aid autonomous vehicles by en-
abling them to safely and efficiently travel. Vehicles will be able to guide themselves
around obstacles, interact with nearby vehicles, and navigate by communicating with
infrastructure and each other. Of particular interest are the safety and efficiency
implications of managing autonomous intersections. By definition, intersections rep-
resent those places where vehicles traveling in different directions must share access
to a physical location. In contrast, typical travel lanes, in which vehicles also must
share access, have vehicles traveling in the same direction, and with similar velocities.
Reservation-based protocols exist to handle autonomous vehicle traffic, as well
as mixtures of semi-autonomous and traditional non-autonomous vehicles. Reserva-
tions, analogous to hotel reservations for rooms and guests, are a pairing of times and
locations which are used to ensure no two vehicles occupy the same space at the same
time. In addition to safety, these protocols promise the benefit of drastically reduced
average delay experienced by all vehicles when compared to traditional intersections.
However, none of the currently available protocols provide the opportunity for the
human to maintain control of a vehicle without traditional traffic signals which un-
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avoidably increase average delay. Removing the traditional signals at an autonomous
intersection while allowing human control of a semi-autonomous vehicle is the focus
of this research.
1.2 Problem Statement
While properly handling the safety and efficiency aspects of managing intersections
with autonomous vehicles, V2V communications and reservation-based intersection
management protocols introduce aspects that do not exist in traditional intersections.
It is paramount to prepare for new attack vectors and failure sources posed by the
networks formed among infrastructure and autonomous vehicles. Unlike many cyber
attacks today, attacks within this domain may result in property damage, physical
injury, and even death. This research uses a synthetic environment to explore the
possible misbehaviors of autonomous vehicles in vehicle-to-anything (V2X) commu-
nications to avoid costs and personal injury in the real world. Misbehavior includes
explicit cyber attacks as well as actions that may not in the real world be malicious
in nature.
In addition to exploring the impact of misbehavior, this research also examines the
implications of allowing humans to retain control over semi-autonomous vehicles while
navigating autonomous intersections without the use of traditional traffic signaling
systems. Autonomous intersections communicate with vehicles to schedule arrival
times and safe routes rather than using traditional traffic signals or stop signs. Current
research in the area of reservation-based protocols has not explored the possibility
of humans maintaining control of a semi-autonomous vehicle while navigating an
autonomous intersection without the use of the traditional traffic signal.
The ultimate goal of such a persistent human control intersection protocol is two
fold: i) allow humans to retain control of a semi-autonomous vehicle using the protocol
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and ii) retain as much benefit as possible, in terms of decreased delay, from the use of
a reservation-based intersection management protocol for fully autonomous vehicles.
1.3 Research Objectives
It has been shown that attackers are able to gain control of a vehicle via the
Internet, given the right circumstances [2]. However, the cybersecurity aspect of this
research is focused on misbehavior between vehicles and intersections. The synthetic
environment provides the realistic experimental sandbox to visualize the effects of the
misbehavior scenarios presented. It also offers a similar environment to safely and
quickly test the human ability to safely navigate an autonomous intersection while
maintaining control of the vehicle. The research questions are outlined below:
• Does the reservation-based protocol within the synthetic environment guarantee
safety by preventing collisions between vehicles?
• Is the total average delay experienced by the autonomous vehicles roughly equiv-
alent to an established reservation-based protocol?
• What scenarios, unique to this domain, can be used to validate the reservation-
based protocol within the synthetic environment?
• Are there any effective mitigating strategies to defend against the misbehavior
scenarios presented?
• Are the misbehaviors completely mitigated?
• Is it feasible to introduce persistent human control into the reservation-based
protocol?
• What feedback mechanisms are necessary to maintain safety while navigating
an intersection?
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• What precautions need to be taken to ensure the safety of the intersection?
To answer the above research questions, the below objectives are outlined for this
thesis:
• Build a synthetic environment capable of hosting autonomous vehicles, semi-
autonomous vehicles, and autonomous infrastructure.
• Develop a reservation-based protocol to safely and efficiently manage an au-
tonomous intersection within the synthetic environment.
• Determine scenarios of possible misbehavior within V2X communications with
respect to autonomous intersections.
• Develop mitigation strategies for defending against the misbehavior sources de-
termined.
• Introduce persistent human control to the reservation-based protocol within a
semi-autonomous vehicle.
• Determine and implement human feedback mechanisms to aid drivers in navi-
gating an autonomous intersection.
1.4 Approach
The approach to answer the research questions mentioned is to make use of a
physics based synthetic environment which lends itself to test cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPSs) such as autonomous vehicles. The environment hosts the autonomous
intersection and its reservation-based protocol as well as fully and semi-autonomous
vehicles.
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Verification and validation scenarios are designed to establish the developed pro-
tocol as roughly equivalent to Autonomous Intersection Management (AIM), an es-
tablished protocol designed for safely and efficiently managing an autonomous inter-
section, and that the protocol behaves as expected when misbehavior is introduced
[3]. The verification scenarios include trials using the AIM protocol and the synthetic
environment’s protocol. Once the verification scenarios are executed and the response
variables are proven statistically equivalent, then the validation scenarios is executed.
The misbehavior scenarios provide validation of the reservation-based protocol within
the synthetic environment when expected results are attained.
Finally, once the reservation-based protocol is established as statistically equiv-
alent to AIM and behaves as expected in the misbehavior scenarios, the persistent
human controls are introduced. The scenarios executed to test the human controls
are notional and do not contain human subjects testing.
1.5 Organization
The organization of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter II details background information and related research. First, it intro-
duces terminology used in this thesis concerning autonomous vehicles and infrastruc-
ture, including a taxonomy of autonomy in vehicles. Then, it outlines leading simu-
lation environments for vehicle cybersecurity research as well as current reservation-
based autonomous intersection management protocols developed for autonomous and
semi-autonomous vehicles.
Chapter III describes the salient details of the synthetic environment and the
reservation-based protocol. This chapter highlights the assumptions, constraints,
and limitations within the synthetic environment. Also provided are a number of
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scenarios for the verification and validation of the synthetic environment along with
the persistent human control scenario.
Chapter IV provides the results, analysis, and other observations of the scenarios
presented in Chapter III. Among the results and analyses presented are those of the
verification and validation scenarios. The chapter discusses the baseline verification
scenario results of the reservation-based protocol and shows the expected responses to
the verification misbehavior scenarios. Preliminary observations are made in response
to the persistent human control scenario within the synthetic environment.
Finally, Chapter V concludes with a summary of all the research presented in this
thesis. Future work areas are captured along with other implications and benefits of
the synthetic environment.
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II. Background
This chapter presents background knowledge and information to provide an un-
derstanding of current state-of-practice for cyber-physical system (CPS) simulation
environments and reservation-based autonomous intersection management protocols.
It begins with a vehicle autonomy taxonomy, followed by an overview of CPSs,
existing simulators available for vehicle and CPS research, an introduction to the
reservation-based protocol Autonomous Intersection Management (AIM), and a brief
overview of electronic control unit (ECU), controller area network (CAN), vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V), and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) cybersecurity. Finally, the chapter
closes detailing the need for a real-time three-dimensional (3D) cybersecurity research
platform for vehicular CPSs to develop a reservation-based intersection management
protocol that incorporates persistent human control.
2.1 Taxonomy of Vehicle Autonomy
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and Society of Au-
tomotive Engineers (SAE) provide a taxonomy of the levels of autonomy in vehicles
[4]. Listed are five levels of autonomy and those levels are shown with a brief de-
scription in Table 1. Levels 4 and 5 describe autonomous vehicles which are capable
of driving themselves without human intervention (in a majority of circumstances).
According to these descriptions, Levels 4 and 5 may provide the option of a human
driver to assume control of the vehicle. Levels 0 through 2 contain the majority of
the current mainstream vehicles on the road today. Levels 0 and 1 include traditional
vehicles that may come equipped with cruise control, while Level 2 autonomous vehi-
cles attain partial autonomy while a human driver is required to stay fully engaged.
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Examples of Level 2 autonomous vehicles (and perhaps Level 3 arguably soon) are
Tesla’s Models S, 3, and X with its Autopilot feature [5].
Table 1. Automation Levels set by SAE
Level of Automation Description
Human driver required
Level 0 - No Automation Completely non-autonomous; the driver performs all
driving tasks.
Level 1 - Driver Assistance Vehicle is controlled by the driver, but some driving
assist features may be included in the vehile design
such as traditional cruise control.
Level 2 - Partial Automation Vehicle has combined automated functions, like ac-
cleration and steering, but the driver must remain en-
gaged with the driving task and monitor the environ-
ment at all times.
Level 3 - Conditional Automation Driver is a necessity, but is not required to monitor
the environment. The driver must be ready to take
control of the vehicle at all times upon request.
Human driver not required
Level 4 - High Automation The vehicle is capable of performing all driving func-
tions under certain conditions including limitations on
locations and evironments. The driver may have the
option to control the vehicle.
Level 5 - Full Automatin The vehicle is capable of performing all driving func-
tions under all conditions. The driver may, or may
not, have the option to control the vehicle.
Throughout this thesis the main focus is on autonomy Levels 3 - 5 where a human
may be in control of a semi-autonomous vehicle. Regardless of the autonomy level,
vehicles require the capability to communicate with surrounding vehicles and infras-
tructure via vehicle-to-anything (V2X) to take advantage of the reservation-based
protocols presented in this work.
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2.2 Cyber-Physical Systems
CPS is a term describing systems that are characterized by the integration of
computers and physical processes. They can receive information from a physical en-
vironment (via a sensor) and translate it to a digital representation for some useful
computation. Also, they can produce a physical effect (e.g. engaging brakes) from
some computation, possibly from data received by another CPS. CPSs are often
resource constrained, utilize embedded systems, and have a limited network band-
width. They are also typically networked in groups to produce the desired effects [6].
Naturally, ECUs on a vehicle’s CAN architecture are CPSs. For instance, a partic-
ular ECU may estimate road speed and provide the estimate to a central ECU to
determine whether or not to illuminate a warning to fasten a seatbelt.
With the increased use of CPSs, to include the emergence of V2V and V2I, it is
vital to be able to conduct cybersecurity tests on vehicles. Checkoway experimentally
and systematically studied the externally-facing attack surface of a vehicle. Through
this investigation it was shown that a vehicle can be compromised without direct
access to that vehicle: an attacker could compromise a vehicle via the infotainment
system using a malicious compact disc or even a PassThru device used by maintenance
personnel [7].
These attacks present a need for a synthetic environment to safely conduct cyber-
security research on given vehicle components in custom scenarios. A real-time 3D
simulator with customizable hardware and/or software ECUs could meet this need.
2.3 Existing Simulators
There are a number of vehicle and CPS simulators that exist today. This section
gives a brief outline of some of the existing simulators, their purposes, and how they
fall short of the purpose of this research.
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Sandia National Laboratories has developed the Virtual Control System Environ-
ments (VCSE) simulator to conduct cybersecurity research on CPSs. However, this
simulated environment focuses exclusively on CPSs in the realm of Supervisory Con-
trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems (e.g. oil refineries and electrical grid
systems). The simulator does, however, offer real-time visualization of these SCADA
systems from the virtual controls to the 3D models [8].
Gulliver, developed at the University of Gothenburg, is a testbed for vehicular
systems with a focus on cyber-physical aspects of designs. The testbed uses small-
scale prototypes of cars rather than a virtual world simulation. One of Gulliver’s
claims to relevance is its low cost of implementation, which is at least one or two
orders of magnitude less than a full-scale vehicular prototyping unit [9]. However, for
purposes of cyberspace research, the small-scale model, which can cost up to $2,500
each, would not be cost effective. Of interest in this research is the real time effects
of cyber stimuli (malicious or otherwise) on a vehicular system.
Figure 1. Small-scale Gulliver model vehicle [10]
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Figueiredo outlines a number of simulators that were developed for use in the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Urban Challenge. The DARPA
competition simulators were used to test each team’s autonomous vehicle prior to the
competition. The simulators were developed in-house at their respective universities.
Figueiredo also surveys the use of robotic simulators as well as game engines such
as Epic Games’ open-source Unreal Engine [11]. Most notably, these simulators do
not implement cybersecurity testing. They were designed to test autonomous vehi-
cles using sensors such as Global Positioning System (GPS) and cameras to navigate
in urban traffic environments. These simulators also lack V2V/V2I communication
devices, or the implementation of individual ECU simulation.
The 3D virtual world game engine known as AFTR Burner offers the ability to
build the synthetic environment needed. Nykl et. al. developed the game engine
originally as an educational teaching tool, however, it has the ability to be quickly
adapted to an array of custom purposes such as the development of Automated Aerial
Refueling [12], [13]. The AFTR Burner engine uses the open source OpenGL graphics
library to render the realistic 3D graphics and is compatible with the open source
physics engine known as Open Dynamics Engine [14]. In addition to offering realistic
graphics and physics, the AFTR Burner engine is capable of integrating with sensors
and CAN traffic. This feature is ideal for introducing human controls such as a
steering wheel and an accelerator.
2.4 Reservation-based Protocols
Intersections pose a unique challenge to autonomous vehicles. Open roads ideally
do not contain pedestrians, cyclists, or large variances in speed and direction between
vehicles. On the other hand, intersections have vehicles crossing paths and changing
directions constantly. The challenge of managing autonomous vehicles at an inter-
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section is exactly what Dresner and Stone designed AIM to do [3]. Figure 2 shows a
screen capture from the AIM Simulator designed to test the protocol.
Figure 2. Screen capture of AIM Simulator
AIM is a protocol that autonomous vehicles, in theory, could use to communicate
with intersections to safely and efficiently schedule passage. AIM uses V2I communi-
cations to operate. Each vehicle uses a driver agent to operate the vehicle and request
clearance, known as a reservation, to proceed through an intersection. To make this
request, vehicle sends a message to the intersection manager. The intersection man-
ager executes an algorithm to determine if the requesting vehicle may proceed as
requested with a reservation confirmation message. Otherwise, the intersection man-
ager may reject the requesting vehicle’s request with a rejection message. Along with
this reject message is a suggested alternate later reservation. If a vehicle’s request is
rejected, then it must either accelerate or decelerate and then make another request.
AIM, however, is designed with the assumption that all vehicles are fully autonomous.
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Using a protocol such as AIM, Sharon and Stone note that improvements to intersec-
tion delay are not seen until the expected penetration of fully autonomous vehicles
with V2X capabilities exceeds 90% [15]. Practically speaking, for successful evolution
from coarse time sharing (traditional traffic signals) to fine time sharing (AIM), a
transitional period where all levels of autonomous vehicles are present simultaneously
is necessary, for which AIM is not designed.
Au, Zhang, and Stone developed Semi-Autonomous Intersection Management
(SemiAIM) to handle this transitional period [16]. This extension of AIM incor-
porates semi-autonomous vehicles. In this protocol, the human drivers relinquish
control of their vehicles prior to entering the intersection. Also, the protocol requires
the use of traffic signals. Semi-autonomous vehicles failing to get a confirmed reser-
vation must come to a stop and treat the intersection as a traditional traffic signal
intersection. The signals are also used for non-autonomous vehicles, which are also
allowed in this protocol.
Sharon and Stone developed Hybrid Autonomous Intersection Management (H-AIM)
seeking to improve the efficiency of AIM when there is a low concentration of au-
tonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles [15]. This extension to the protocol increases
the efficiency of AIM when less than 90% of vehicles on the road are fully autonomous.
The key differences in this protocol are: 1) the ability of the intersection to detect
incoming non-autonomous vehicles and 2) allowing autonomous vehicles to receive
reservations that do not conflict with the incoming non-autonomous vehicles’ pos-
sible paths through the intersection. This protocol also requires traffic signals for
human driven vehicles, which do not have V2X communication capabilities.
Still missing from each of these protocols is an option for a human-driven vehicle
with V2X capabilities to request and receive a reservation, yet allow the human to
maintain persistent control over the vehicle. Vehicles at a Levels 2 - 5 automation
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level can allow a human to control steering, velocity, or both while navigating through
an autonomous intersection without traffic signals. Building and testing this type of
protocol necessitates a realistic synthetic environment since the human is reacting to
simulated stimuli.
In such an environment, cybersecurity aspects of the developed protocols can also
be studied. There are a number of attack scenarios worth studying when considering
smart intersections using reservation-based protocols. For instance, malicious actors
could spoof reservation request messages, reservation confirmation messages, or reser-
vation rejection messages. A denial of service (DoS) attack against the intersection
manager could also be studied in such an environment.
2.5 ECU and CAN Network Cybersecurity
The complexity of electronics and the number of ECUs have increased in the last
ten years. ECUs are embedded systems that control one or more subsystems of a
vehicle. They can control anything from the power windows to cruise control systems
and braking systems. One type of ECU is the engine control module which can control
things such as air intake, fuel injection, and monitor temperatures and other sensor
information [17]. Compromises in security in these CPSs could modify the vehicle’s
behavior and potentially lead to crashes, resulting in serious injury or death.
Multiple ECUs present on a vehicle are networked together with the use of one or
more CANs. This architecture was originally developed by Bosch as a multi-master
message broadcast system. Using this broadcast network, many short messages are
sent from one transmitter to all other transmitters on the network [18]. Inherent to the
CAN bus architecture is a lack of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication,
and non-repudiation. Messages sent across the CAN can, and are, read by all other
nodes residing on the bus. There is no notion of sender and receiver addresses or
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digital signatures [19]. It has been shown by Koscher et. al. that, given the right
accesses, an attacker can directly manipulate safety critical ECUs to create unsafe
conditions. Furthermore, Koscher analyzed the security implications of an attacker
with prior access to a vehicle’s internal network, not the methods used to gain access.
With the future introduction and use of V2X within vehicles, the attack surface of a
vehicle will be further broadened [2] beyond the currently vulnerable indirect attack
surface presented by Checkoway [7].
Woo et. al. proved that it is possible to attack a vehicle’s CAN bus through
the use of a malicious diagnostics application on a smartphone. The attack does not
require direct access to a vehicle. It does, however, require a victim to download
a seemingly legitimate, but actually malicious, diagnostic application on his or her
smartphone. Once the victim’s smartphone is connected to the target vehicle via the
on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) port, the attacker then has the ability to execute the
attack. The smartphone’s cellular connection and the attacker’s server are used to
carry out the attack which could result in the engine stopping or some other safety
feature failing [20].
2.6 V2X Cybersecurity
V2X is the communication between a given vehicle and its surroundings. The
surroundings could be other vehicles or infrastructure such as intersections. Its pur-
pose is aimed at improving driver and passenger safety as well as improving traffic
management. Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) are designed to provide an architecture for nodes
within a vehicle network (V2X). These V2X communications utilize the 5.9 GHz
band with 75 MHz of bandwidth. The nodes within the architecture can be station-
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ary nodes known as road side units (RSUs) or nodes located on vehicles known as
on-board units (OBUs).
In [21], Laurendeau provides an outline of the threats to V2X’s availability, au-
thentication, and confidentiality.
2.6.1 Availability.
Threats to V2X’s availability include DoS, malware, and spamming.
• DoS - DoS attacks cause a network to be unavailable to its legitimate users by
means of flooding or jamming.
• Malware - Malware is the introduction of malicious software such as viruses and
worms. Addition of malware into a vehicular network could be carried out by
a rogue insider when pushing out updates to software or firmware to vehicle
ECUs.
• Spamming - Spamming by marketers is more of a nuisance, but it can cause
troubles in a vehicular network due to increased network latency.
2.6.2 Authentication.
Threats to V2X’s authentication include masquerading, black hole, replay, GPS
spoofing, broadcast tampering, and transaction tampering.
• Masquerading - A masquerading attack is one where a rogue node (RSU or
OBU) poses as a legitimate node.
• Black Hole - A black hole is an in-network node which does not pass along
messages as it is intended to do. This attack cause legitimate nodes to not
receive critical update messages, therefore possibly paving the way for further
attacks.
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• Replay - Replay attacks are not considered a strong attack vector due to WAVE’s
ability to defend against it using a cache of recently received messages. Other-
wise, an attacker would be able to eavesdrop a message from a legitimate node
and reuse it later in time for malicious purposes.
• GPS Spoofing - GPS spoofing consists of an attacker being able to simulate GPS
signals strong enough to be received by the GPS receiver rather than legitimate
GPS signals.
• Broadcast Tampering - Broadcast tampering involves an attacker broadcasting
false messages. Since messages are signed, this attack would get the attacker’s
node quickly placed on a black-list. In addition, the difficulty is high for this
type of attack.
• Transaction tampering - Transaction tampering is a man-in-the-middle attack
where an attacker manipulates multiple messages between two other nodes.
This attack is technically difficult due to message encryption.
2.6.3 Confidentiality.
Threats to V2X’s confidentiality include outsider eavesdropping, insider eaves-
dropping, and location tracking.
• Outsider Eavesdropping - Outsider eavesdropping involves an attacker listening
to messages not destined to the attacker. This does not include broadcast
messages since everyone is intended to receive those types of messages. This
attack is exceptionally difficult.
• Insider Eavesdropping - Insider eavesdropping involves a node that legitimately
has information collection authority, however, collects the information outside
of any agreed windows of time.
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• Location Tracking - Location tracking is when an attacker tracks the location
of a vehicle over time and builds a potentially damaging profile of the victim.
2.7 Summary
Currently there are no efforts to incorporate persistent human control into a
reservation-based intersection protocol. A 3D virtual world synthetic environment
is ideal for developing such a protocol. The environment lends itself to also test many
aspects of cybersecurity unique to CPSs relating to autonomous vehicles. A virtual
world environment with the capability to incorporate hardware or software ECUs with
a CAN architecture, autonomous vehicles, human drivers, and V2X communications
would greatly add realism to vehicular cyber research. Consider an experiment where
high speeds are required prior to an exploitation of a vulnerability. Safety concerns
would likely preclude the experiment from being run in real life, even on a closed test
range with experienced drivers. Such a virtualized environment could save thousands
of dollars in the purchasing of vehicles, or scaled models, solely to conduct research
when the physical vehicle may be irrelevant. Also, during a designed experiment with
some given scenario, multiple runs could be conducted with essentially a push of a
button.
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III. Synthetic Environment Development
3.1 Objective
To begin this research effort, a synthetic environment is required. The environ-
ment will offer a the ability to realistically model autonomous vehicles and inter-
sections. Incorporating human control is also enabled by the synthetic environment
since it keeps costs and safety risks low. The synthetic environment must be able
to host cyber attacks against cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and aid in implement-
ing the mitigations and incorporate the use of human controls and realistic feedback
mechanisms. The environment must offer real-time visualizations of the attacks and
allow a high level of control. This is important for repeatability, given any num-
ber of control variables. The specific cyber attacks presented in this research are
referred to as misbehaviors within the reservation-based protocol used for managing
the intersection.
The validation experiments here are aimed to show the impact of the developed
mitigation strategies against a number of misbehavior scenarios. Each scenario has
several different control factors be detailed and evaluated in the following sections.
However, prior to running experiments in the developed synthetic environment, a
proper verification baseline needs to be established to demonstrate the fidelity of the
synthetic environment’s autonomous behavior. It needs to be established that, given
some assumptions, the reservation-based protocol is equivalent to that of a protocol
such as Autonomous Intersection Management (AIM) [3].
The synthetic environment will use the AFTR Burner three-dimensional (3D) vir-
tual world game engine [12] and Open Dynamics Engine (ODE) to provide realistic
physics. Other simulators, discussed in Chapter II, do not provide an environment
conducive to the necessary scenarios without significant modifications. The AFTR
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Burner 3D virtual world game engine is a viable option for development of the re-
quired synthetic environment. Intersections within the synthetic environment utilize a
reservation-based intersection management protocol similar to that of the AIM proto-
col developed by Dresner [3]. AIM has been proven to provide safe and efficient traffic
control for fully autonomous vehicles in a fully autonomous scenario. In addition to a
realistic synthetic environment, the protocol and its accompanying two-dimensional
simulator also lack the ability to insert misbehavior, execute cyber attack scenar-
ios, and demonstrate the use of mitigations in their defense. The AIM Simulator is
also not designed to handle semi-autonomy, namely human controls, such as steering
and/or accelerator inputs via controller area network (CAN) traffic or otherwise.
Prior to conducting any misbehavior scenarios, a verification baseline comparison
between the synthetic environment and the AIM protocol simulator is needed. This
baseline shows the validity of the algorithm used in the synthetic environment. To
show this comparison, two comparable simulations are executed with the same control
variables. The variables held constant between the two simulations are the number
of vehicles generated per lane per hour, number of roads in each direction, and the
number of lanes per road. If these two simulations show statistically similar response
variables then a baseline will be attained. This baseline shows that the algorithm used
in the synthetic environment, given the assumptions made, is sufficiently equivalent
to AIM and is fit to simulate a single autonomous intersection for the purposes of
this research.
3.2 Design Decisions and Constraints
Level 4 and 5 autonomous vehicles are already occupying public roadways in the
United States in addition to the eminent semi-autonomous vehicles mentioned in
Chapter I. Google claims its autonomous vehicles in the Waymo project have been
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tested on approximately 3.5 million miles of streets since its conception in 2009,
including tests without human occupants [22]. It is estimated that over 94% of new
cars sold will be fully autonomous in the year 2040 [23]. A synthetic environment
offers the ability to model autonomous vehicles and infrastructure well before this
time.
Objects within the AFTR Burner 3D virtual world engine are referred to as world
objects. The world object chosen to represent the autonomous vehicle is a generic
four door sedan and the intersection is a standard intersection without traffic signals.
The intersections in this research are limited to the same number of lanes inbound
and outbound from all directions (i.e. north, south, east, and west). This limitation
on the number of lanes leads to simplicity in implementation.
With the goal of conducting experiments on autonomous vehicles and intersections
within the synthetic environment, the need arises for a protocol suited to manage the
autonomous intersection. The AIM protocol served as the model reservation-based
protocol within the synthetic environment.
The following requirements are to be used to build the synthetic environment:
• Simulation clock - simulations shall be timed with a clock that accurately
tracks time within the simulation independent of wall-clock time.
• Intersection
Reservation grid size - the grid size, discussed in section 3.3.3, can be
set to any positive integer.
Lanes - the intersection may be assigned any number of incoming lanes
from each direction.
Speed limits - a maximum speed must be set for the road prior to the
intersection and a maximum speed within the intersection.
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Range - the set maximum distance from the intersection a vehicle can be
to communicate with it via vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications.
Stopping Distance - a set distance from the intersection a vehicle must
stop without a confirmed reservation; it may only proceed if it obtains a reser-
vation.
• Autonomous Vehicles
Path - the autonomous vehicles shall follow a predetermined path during
simulations.
Collision Detection - collisions between vehicles (safety violations) are
detected using the ODE, discussed in section 3.3.6.
Human Control - an input device shall be used to control steering and
acceleration via CAN traffic.
3.3 Synthetic Environment
This section describes the salient features designed within the synthetic environ-
ment. These features include the simulation clock, the intersection reservation grid,
and the reservation-based protocol. Also discussed are the algorithm used to control
the fully autonomous vehicles, assumptions about the sensors used, and finally the
proposed human control and feedback mechanisms unique to this research.
3.3.1 Simulation Clock.
To provide a clock to synchronize the messaging protocol and time-space reserva-
tions, a simulation clock class was designed. This class utilizes ODE’s built in clock.
The physics engine updates the physics of each world object on a single “tick”. Each
tick represents 1/60th of a second in simulation time. The number of ticks per frame
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rendered to the screen is controlled and is typically set to a number between 0 and
10. If the number of ticks per frame is set to 6, then each frame rendered to the
screen represents 1/10th second of simulation. The physics engine has the ability to
be paused, by setting the engine ticks per frame to 0. This gives the researcher the
ability to analyze the behavior of the autonomous vehicles and intersection in real
time or compressed time depending on frame rate and the number of physics engine
ticks per frame.
The simulation clock class used in the synthetic environment receives the simu-
lation time from the physics engine. Each world object is then able to update the
synchronized simulation time from this class. To make reservations within the inter-
section which is discussed later in this section, the spatial domain must be coupled
with the temporal domain. Each moment in time is allocated a complete grid of
reservation tiles within the intersection. Moments in time within the synthetic en-
vironment are 1/100th of a second. For example, if a reservation is for exactly 1.5
seconds, then there exists exactly 150 reservation tile grids. This is discussed in more
detail in section 3.3.3.
3.3.2 Intersection Structure.
The autonomous intersection class includes the algorithm used to operate the
intersection autonomously and ensure safety of the approaching vehicles while they
cross through the intersection. The intersection class maintains the reservation grid
class as one of its member variables. The reservation grid class includes all current
reservations and contains the logic to determine if reservations may be safely ap-
proved, referred to as confirmed, or must otherwise be denied. The intersection class
handles incoming and outgoing vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) request and response
messages.
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Variables that can be set arbitrarily include the intersections location, road side
unit (RSU) communication range distance, intersection identification number, lane
width, number of lanes, and grid dimensions. Also included in the autonomous in-
tersection class are the functions that provide the ability to mitigate misbehavior,
discussed later.
The lane numbering scheme uses non-negative integer values to identify lanes.
Each lane number modulus 4 determines its heading. See Table 2 for the numbering
scheme. Figure 3 shows example lane numbers for a four lane intersection.
Table 2. Lane numbering scheme for intersections
(Lane Number) mod 4 Direction
0 North
1 East
2 South
3 West
Figure 3. Example lane numbers for four lane intersection
24
3.3.3 Reservation Grid.
The idea of the reservation grid was introduced by Dresner and Stone to enable
the AIM protocol to guarantee no collisions between vehicles [3]. A reservation grid is
broken up into n×n individual square regions. Each square represents an occupied or
vacant state for the corresponding location. Each discrete moment in time (1/100th
of a second in simulation time) is represented by a single grid of tiles. Figure 4 shows
a 34×34 reservation grid at a single moment in time in the synthetic environment. To
ensure no collisions occur, no two vehicles may be granted a reservation that would
cause any of the same squares to be occupied at the same moment in time.
Figure 4. Reservation grid at a single moment in time
The reservation grid is its own class within the synthetic environment. This class
maintains a collection of the legal turns (or paths) that are available within the in-
tersection, the current confirmed reservations, and all the logic to process reservation
requests. These reservation requests may be confirmed or denied based on the con-
firmed reservations. The reservations are granted on a first come, first served basis.
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When a vehicle requests a reservation from the intersection, it first retrieves a
copy of the path through the intersection. The vehicle then uses the information to
generate a reservation request message based on its estimated arrival time and speed
in the intersection. See section 3.3.4 for more details.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this class maintains the current reserva-
tions made by requests received from incoming autonomous vehicles. Each discrete
moment in time requires one reservation grid of tiles which represents the area within
the intersection. The reservation grid class also processes each request by checking
the current state of the previously confirmed reservations. If there are no conflicts,
then the reservation may be confirmed. The next section provides more details on
this behavior.
3.3.4 Reservation Protocol.
Reservations are established through messages sent between world objects within
the synthetic environment. These messages simulate V2I communication between
autonomous vehicles and the intersection. This exchange of information is essential
to maintain safety of the autonomous vehicles as they pass through the intersection.
The number one priority of the reservation protocol is that no collisions occur between
vehicles.
When an autonomous vehicle comes into range of an intersection, it begins to
formulate a reservation request message. It first receives the path information from
the intersection based on its arrival lane number and the desired turn direction. Once
the mapping between times and locations within the intersection has been generated
by the autonomous vehicle using the path information, it then sends the request to
the intersection. The intersection then determines whether or not the reservation can
be granted and replies to the vehicle accordingly. If the reservation is made, then
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the car is cleared to proceed. However, if the reservation is denied, then the vehicle
is required to decelerate and attempt to make another reservation request. Figure 5
shows a high-level flowchart of the messaging protocol.
Figure 5. High level view of reservation messaging process
When an intersection receives a message from an autonomous vehicle, it deter-
mines if the reservation is in conflict with any reservations that have already been
made. It does this by comparing the mapping between times and reservation tile
grids that were sent in the message. It compares the reservation tile grid from a
given time in the request to the reservation tile grid that already exists. If there are
no conflicts found, then the reservations may be made. Once a reservation is made,
the intersection maintains it so that subsequent requests do not interfere with it. If
there are conflicts found with the requested reservation, then the reservation must be
rejected. Otherwise, a collision will likely occur between two autonomously controlled
vehicles.
The intersection has the ability to broadcast messages out to all connected ve-
hicles within range. These broadcast messages are used to cancel previously made
reservations in the event that cancellation becomes necessary (e.g., in an emergency
situation). The cancellation message holds enough information to allow the cancella-
tion of selected lanes and turn directions, rather than simply all reservations.
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3.3.5 Driver Agent.
The logic which controls an autonomous vehicle’s behavior is the driver agent.
The pseudocode for the driver agent used in the AIM Simulator was used as a model
for the driver agent in this work [3]. The driver agent controls the velocity of the
vehicle based on its location in the synthetic environment, reservation status with the
upcoming intersection, and the vehicle’s proximity to other vehicles.
The velocity of the vehicle, steering, and messaging functions of the driver agent
are executed independently to assist in testing the persistent human control aspect of
the protocol. Each can be set to human controlled or autonomously controlled during
the human control and autonomous scenarios, respectively.
3.3.6 Collision Detection.
The number one priority for any intersection management protocol is safety. Even
traditional intersections focus on safety through the design of traffic lights, stop signs,
and traffic laws. Therefore, the ability to detect safety violations is a requirement for
the synthetic environment.
The AFTR Burner virtual world uses the ODE physics engine to detect collisions
between world objects. Collision detection of a 3D world object requires the physics
engine to maintain bounding volumes, a 3D geometry in which to enclose the world
object. These volumes are used to detect collisions between world objects. They
come in a number of options such as spheres, axis-aligned bounding boxes (AABBs),
oriented bounding boxes (OBBs), and convex hulls. These are described in Table 3 in
ascending order of precision and descending order of computational speed [24, 25].
28
Table 3. Bounding volumes for collision detection
3D Geometry Description Visualization
Sphere A spherical geometry of a given radius
enveloping a world object. Fast colli-
sion detection, low precision bounds.
AABB A rectagular prism geometry envelop-
ing the world object aligned with global
axes. Chages size when object changes
orientation.
OBB A rectangular prism geometry envolop-
ing a world object aligned with its local
axes. Does not change size when object
changes orientation. Used in synthetic
environment.
Convex Hull A 3D geometry made up of many
surfaces that closely approximate the
world object’s shape without concave
surfaces. Slow collision detection, high
precision bounds.
A sphere would over estimate the boundaries above, below, and to the sides of
a vehicle. The AABB shape would necessarily change dimensions (become larger)
whenever a vehicle turns inside an intersection, which is not ideal since it grossly
overestimates the actual volume of the vehicle’s world object. The OBB bounding
box is ideal for use in the synthetic environment because a typical vehicle, from a
top-down view, has a highly rectangular shape and closely matches the world object.
The bounding volumes used in the synthetic environment for this research are OBBs,
referred to from here on as simply “bounding boxes.” A visualization of the bound-
ing box within the synthetic environment is in Figure 6. The red, green, and blue
lines represent the x, y, and z axis directions relative to the vehicle’s world object,
respectively.
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Figure 6. Bounding box of sedan in synthetic environment
Simulated collision detection detects safety violations when world objects, or vehi-
cles, come into contact with one another in the 3D virtual world. In addition to this,
secondary effects of collisions will also be accounted for in the environment. These
secondary effects include collisions between vehicles caused by previous collisions and
increased delays due to crashed vehicles. Any cascading effects caused by a single
collision could be studied as well using these realistic conditions.
3.3.7 Sensors.
A number of sensors are abstracted in order to introduce mitigations into the syn-
thetic environment. During the rogue human driver scenario, a sensor (perhaps using
Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) technology) is used to detect and precisely
locate the rogue vehicle. Once the sensors obtain the information about the location
and size of the vehicle, then the autonomous intersection can take appropriate ac-
tions to ensure the safety of the incoming vehicles. Similarly abstracted sensors are
used by the driver agent to detect vehicles and their speeds directly in front of the
vehicle. Also, the sensors used during the Sybil attack scenario (possibly using radio
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frequency identification (RFID) technology) determine the presence of the vehicles
that are making reservation requests.
3.3.8 Human Controls and Feedback.
This section describes the implementation of the human controls such as the phys-
ical input devices, CAN architecture used, and the feedback mechanisms developed
for the human. Real hardware is needed, such as steering wheel and an accelerator,
to take input from the human operator and provide as much realism as possible. The
feedback mechanisms proposed range from the traditional speedometer to the intro-
duction of a “goal” velocity indicator which is used to communicate to the human
how much faster, or slower, he/she must go.
The hardware chosen for human input is the Logitech G920 racing wheel shown
in Figure 7. In addition to the this physical hardware, hardware is required to con-
vert data to and from CAN traffic. A BeagleBone Black (Figure 8) simulates of the
electronic control units (ECUs) for the accelerator and the steering wheel which con-
verts the output from the wheel and pedals to CAN traffic. The traffic is then placed
on the bus from the Beagle Bone via a transceiver. The virtual world receives the
CAN traffic via a CANtact v1.0 board which reads the CAN traffic from the bus (see
Figure 9).
Figure 7. Logitech G920 racing wheel
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Figure 8. BeagleBone Black
Figure 9. CANtact v1.0 board
A quick description of a standard CAN message frame is shown in Figure 10
and the high-level CAN architecture is shown in Figure 11. The CAN frame format
used has an 11-bit identifier field and a varying length data field to hold the frame’s
contents. The message identification field also serves as the priority of the frame
within the CAN architecture. Frames in this research, though, are limited to two
types of messages: steering and acceleration. It is possible to incorporate other CAN
messages into the synthetic environment.
Figure 10. Standard CAN frame
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Figure 11. CAN network diagram
Table 8 lists the human feedback mechanisms developed within the synthetic en-
vironment. These are in addition to the traditional feedback mechanisms such as a
compass, side view mirrors, a rear view mirror, and a speedometer.
Table 4. Human controls and feedback devices required for persistent human control
Item Description
In-Range Indicator A device that informs the driver of an autonomous
intersection within range.
Request Reservation Button A device that initiates V2X communication to re-
quest a reservation from the intersection.
Denied Reservation Indicator A device which warns a driver that the requested
reservation is denied.
Granted Reservation Indicator A device which confirms to the driver a reservation
is successful and the assigned velocity while within
the intersection.
Goal Velocity Indicator An active device which informs the driver of the re-
quired velocity to maintain to meet keep the reser-
vation. May also be used to maintain the correct
velocity within the intersection.
Maintain Path Indicator An active feedback device which informs the driver
of the left/right position correctness based on the
lane or planned path within the intersection.
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3.4 Assumptions
The assumptions made in this research are related to the synthetic environment
and its design decisions.
• Latency - The messaging protocol is abstracted to function calls between the
vehicle and intersection world object classes. Latency, or delay, between the
sender and receiver is not modeled in this research and therefore is assumed to
be zero.
• Signal Loss - Wireless signal loss is not modeled in the synthetic environment.
• Static Lanes - No lane changes are permitted during travel within the inter-
section. Vehicles turn into the respective destination lanes (e.g. left turns from
inside lanes terminate in inside lanes).
• Turning Paths - For simplicity, turning paths are uniform in nature (quarter-
circles) rather than abrupt 90 degree turns.
• Safety Buffer - While within the intersection, the occupied tiles take into
account an increased size of the vehicle by 25% in each direction for autonomous
vehicles.
• Bounding Box - Each vehicle’s collision detection makes use of a rectangular
prism bounding box. This particular type of bounding box simplifies the physics
engine’s computation complexity to detect collisions while closely modeling the
shape of the vehicles. Refer to section 3.3.6.
• Velocity - The maximum velocity before and after an intersection is 8 meters
per second for fully autonomous vehicles within the synthetic environment. A
constant velocity of 8 meters per second is required within the intersection for
all directions for fully autonomous vehicles.
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• Single Intersection - Inside the synthetic environment, a single intersection
with two inbound lanes from each cardinal direction is used.
• Ambient Environment - There are no obstructions visual, or otherwise,
present in the synthetic environment (i.e. the environment is clear with high
visibility).
• Vehicles Only - No obstacles, except the intersection and vehicles, are present
in the synthetic environment (i.e. no pedestrians or wild animals).
• Reservation Order - Within a lane, a given vehicle may request a reserva-
tion if and only if the vehicle directly in front of it has a reservation. This is
accomplished with vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, and ensures the
road ahead will be clear fo this vehicle.
3.5 Measures
The synthetic environment built for this research provides the ability to repeat
experiments. Along with repeated experiments comes the ability to measure outputs
while setting the desired inputs. This section outlines the high-level independent vari-
ables, dependent variables, and constant factors that are common to each experiment
presented in this research.
3.5.1 Independent Variables.
Independent variables are those that are varied in order to study their influence
on the dependent variables. The independent variables common throughout the pre-
sented misbehavior scenarios within the synthetic environment are presented below.
• Vehicle Generation Rate - The number of vehicles generated per hour per
lane. The AIM Simulator randomly generates vehicles at different time inter-
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vals, therefore the actual number of vehicles generated per hour per lane is
approximately the generation rate.
• Misbehavior - Various misbehaviors take place in their respective scenarios.
For example, a non-autonomous vehicle may be stopped within the intersection.
These misbehaviors are varied in order to study their influence on the dependent
variables.
3.5.2 Dependent Variables.
Dependent variables are those that are being studied in response to varying the
independent variables. The dependent variables common throughout the presented
misbehavior scenarios within the synthetic environment are presented below.
• Average Total Delay - This response variable is measured in seconds. It
represents the average amount of extra time taken to travel through the au-
tonomous intersection due to traffic.
• Maximum Total Delay - This measure is the largest delay experienced by a
single vehicle which completes the route through the intersection.
• Total Throughput - This response variable is measured in vehicles. It is
the number of vehicles that the intersection was able to safely service during
the simulation. The throughput is increased by 1 each time a vehicle safely
traverses the intersection from any direction. A vehicle is considered serviced
when it departs the intersection.
• Total Collisions - Collisions are safety violations that are simply physical
contacts between two or more vehicles. One or more collisions in any scenario
results in the synthetic environment failing the baseline.
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3.5.3 Calculation of Dependent Variables.
This section describes the methods used to collect data to calculate the dependent
variables after each experiment in the AIM Simulator and the synthetic environment.
3.5.3.1 Output Logs.
The AIM Simulator and the synthetic environment have the ability to produce
an arrival and departure data output log in the format of a comma separated value
(CSV) file. This log is generated at the end of an experiment, or any time deemed
necessary by the experimenter. Each entry in the log contains the vehicle identifica-
tion number (VIN), a time stamp (s), event type, type of vehicle, starting lane ID,
and destination direction. See Table 5 for example contents of this log data. The
lane numbers and destinations have to be translated from the lane numbering scheme
used in the synthetic environment to those used in the AIM Simulator so that the
same parsing script may be used for both environments. Having these calculations
done independent of the synthetic environment allows for processing of the output
data well after the experiment ends and the synthetic environment is terminated.
Table 5. Excerpt from arrival and departure data log
VIN Time Stamp Location Stamp Vehicle Type Start Lane ID Destination Direction
1002 8.32 East Bound Entrance Sedan 5 South
1002 38.94 South Bound Exit Sedan 5 South
3.5.3.2 Processing Output Logs.
A separate custom C++ analysis program parses the arrival and departure data
output logs to generate the dependent variables for a given experiment. To calculate
delay, a base case time has to be established for each lane and turning direction. A
base case time is the time needed for a single vehicle to travel from start to finish
without traffic. Once the base case time is recorded for each lane and turning direc-
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tion, then the output logs for each experiment can be processed to produce the delay
calculations. These base case times must be observed in both the AIM Simulator and
the synthetic environment. The script calculates information such as total average
delay, maximum delay, total generated vehicles, and total throughput.
The total number of entries including the word “Entrance” represents the total
number of vehicles generated. The total number of entries including the word “Exit”
represents the total number of vehicles serviced by the intersection, or total through-
put. The number of collisions is determined manually by monitoring the simulation
for crashes between the vehicles.
Microsoft Excel can then be used to run statistical analyses on the output delay
values produced by the C++ analysis program.
3.5.4 Control Variables.
Control variables are those that are held constant in order to study the effects of
the independent variables on the dependent variables. Below are the control variables
common throughout the presented scenarios within the synthetic environment.
• Number of Roads - The number of roads is treated as a constant factor and
held at 1 for each direction. Each experiment in this research uses a single
north-south road and a single east-west road (see Figure 12).
• Number of Lanes per Road - Each road has four lanes, two in each direction.
This variable is held constant throughout the scenarios.
• Grid Size - The grid size is n = 34, which means there are 34 × 34 = 1, 156
individual reservation tiles within the intersection. See Figure 13 for a visualiza-
tion of the reservation grid. The AIM Simulator defaults to this value, thus the
synthetic environment is also set to this value for each of the baseline scenarios.
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• Maximum Velocity - The maximum velocity is held constant at 8 meters per
second before, within, and after the intersection.
• Runtime - This control variable is the amount of simulation time used for any
one experiment. This is set to 1,800 seconds of simulation time, or half an hour.
Figure 12. Single four-lane intersection setup for baseline scenarios
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Figure 13. Reservation grid visualization for n = 34 granularity
3.6 Baseline of Synthetic Environment
This section describes the baseline effort to establish the viability of the au-
tonomous intersection within the synthetic environment. This is also the verification
phase of the synthetic environment and its reservation-based protocol.
3.6.1 Baseline Objective.
The baseline is attained when the average total delay experienced by all vehicles
traveling through the autonomous intersection in the synthetic environment matches
that of the AIM Simulator. The average delay is considered matching if there is no
statistical evidence suggesting that the two averages are different. Also the baseline
requires zero collisions within the synthetic environment. These results need to show
that the algorithm used in the synthetic environment is sufficient to conduct further
experiments using the assumptions made of the baseline experiment. These delays
are presented in Section 4.1.1.
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3.6.2 AIM Simulator Setup.
The baseline experimental setup of the synthetic environment consists of simula-
tions executed between the synthetic environment and the AIM Simulator. Within
the AIM Simulator, the number of roads in all directions is set to one. The number of
lanes is set to four. That is, two lanes in each direction north, south, east, and west.
Finally, the number of vehicles generated per hour per lane is varied. Furthermore,
several modifications are made to the AIM source code to closely match that of the
synthetic environment, for simplicity. The AIM Simulator has the ability to generate
several different types of vehicles, such as coupes, sport utility vehicles, sedans, and
vans. For this baseline, the source code is be modified to limit the type of cars to only
sedans. Also, the maximum speed of the sedan is set to 8 meters per second, matching
that of the synthetic environment. These modifications to the AIM Simulator do not
affect the ability of the traffic management protocol to safely and efficiently schedule
reservations.
The arrival and departure data output from the AIM Simulator is used in the
synthetic environment in order to match the same vehicle generation times. The
output data from the AIM Simulator includes VIN, event time stamp, location of
event, type of vehicle, starting lane number, and destination road. (See Table 5
above for example data output from the AIM Simulator.) The time stamp from
the messages containing entrance data is used to generate vehicles in the synthetic
environment along with the starting lane numbers and destination roads to determine
their paths.
3.6.3 Synthetic Environment Setup.
The synthetic environment uses the same parameters as the AIM Simulator. There
is a single intersection with two inbound and two outbound lanes in each direction.
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The distance each vehicle is generated from the intersection closely matches that of
the AIM Simulator, approximately 100 meters from the intersection. The synthetic
environment parses the AIM output data to match the generation rate and times of
vehicles. Each generated car is positioned in the correct lane at the generate distance
according to the generate schedule. Once the vehicle passes through the intersection
and reaches the same generate distance away from the intersection, it is removed from
the synthetic environment. A record is kept at the moment each autonomous vehicle
is generated and removed to replicate the AIM Simulator’s output data log.
3.6.4 Variables and Constants.
The independent variables and constant factors for the baseline setup are shown in
Table 6. Five trial experiments are executed in each scenario with varying generation
rates. Dependent variables are calculated at the conclusion of each trial based on
arrival and departure data output logs.
Table 6. Baseline scenarios setup
Variable Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Generation Rate* 100 200 300
No. North/South Roads 1 1 1
No. East/West Roads 1 1 1
No. Lanes/Road 4 4 4
Grid Size 34 34 34
Speed Limit (m/s) 8 8 8
Runtime (s) 1800 1800 1800
Trials 5 5 5
*Vehicles per hour per lane
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3.6.5 Delay Calculations.
The data collected from both the AIM Simulator and the synthetic environment
are both parsed to calculate average delay experienced by the autonomous vehicles.
The amount of time required for a vehicle to go from start to finish without conflicting
traffic is used as a base case. Without modifying AIM’s random vehicle generation
processes, several simulations must be run to collect all base case times for all turning
directions from each lane. A single simulation within the synthetic environment can be
designed with no traffic conflicts to get the base case times for each turning direction.
These base case times are used to calculate the average delay experienced by each
vehicle through their respective simulation environment when traffic is present.
A C++ analysis program is used to parse the arrival and departure times for
each vehicle, using their unique VINs, within a single trial. These numbers are then
compared to the base case times for that particular type of vehicle’s starting lane
and turning direction. This number is then averaged for all vehicles within that sim-
ulation, becoming the average total delay. In addition to average delay, the program
also determines the maximum delay experienced by any one vehicle, total number of
generated vehicles, as well as total serviced vehicles by the intersection.
3.7 Scenario 1: Rogue non-Autonomous Vehicle
The first instance of misbehavior introduced into the synthetic environment is that
of a stationary rogue non-autonomous vehicle within the autonomous intersection. As
expected, this non-autonomous vehicle has no means of communicating information
to other vehicles or infrastructure via V2X. Since there is a lack of communication,
the vehicle poses a safety concern to any autonomous vehicles traveling through this
intersection.
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This scenario should not be limited to a rogue vehicle located within the inter-
section. One could easily imagine a number of other road hazards that could take its
place. For instance, especially in rural areas, large wildlife may pose a similar hazard.
Items which have fallen off vehicles and rolling boulders could also be dangerous. All
of which have no means to communicate their presence via V2X communications.
For the placement of this rogue vehicle, there are three different scenarios. An
assumption for these scenarios is that the rogue vehicle is stationary within the in-
tersection.
3.7.1 Rogue Vehicle Approach.
This scenario consists of placing the rogue vehicle in three different locations to
show the expected behavior of the environment and its protocol. The experiment has
a total simulation runtime of 1,800 seconds. First, the rogue vehicle is placed in the
center of the intersection facing southwest. The second position and orientation is in
lane 4, just inside the intersection headed north. Finally, the vehicle is placed facing
northwest in the center of the southeast quadrant of the intersection. See Figures 14,
15, and 16 for the positions and orientations of the three different test cases.
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Figure 14. Rogue vehicle in center of intersection facing southwest
Figure 15. Rogue vehicle in southeast quadrant facing north
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Figure 16. Rogue vehicle in center of southeast quadrant facing northwest
3.7.2 Mitigation.
Without any mitigation techniques or strategies, the rogue vehicle (or other haz-
ard) poses a significant safety concern for all autonomous vehicles using this inter-
section. Within a properly functioning autonomous intersection, near misses are ex-
pected and commonplace due to the nature of the multi-directional traffic patterns.
Autonomous vehicles may not have the proper amount of time to avoid such an obsta-
cle within an intersection; therefore, the intersection must have some defenses against
this type of hazard, otherwise the safety of the intersection is compromised.
The mitigating behaviors of the autonomous intersection should be able to warn
incoming traffic of the rogue vehicle hazard. Within the synthetic environment, one
can use a virtual sensor to locate these rogue objects and warn the incoming drivers
of its location. The strategy to protect against the rogue vehicle involves first locating
the hazard, then broadcasting a warning to all incoming vehicles.
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The first possible strategy is of a simple detect-and-deny fail safe. The intersection
could simply detect the presence of the rogue vehicle and broadcast a warning message
to all incoming autonomous within range. Once receiving the warning broadcast, all
vehicles would then know not to proceed. This mitigation strategy maintains safety
considerations, however, there may not be a reason to block all traffic, especially if the
intersection is large enough to allow the non-obstructed paths to operate as normal.
This alternative method allows the autonomous intersection to stop only some of the
traffic, rather than all of the traffic.
In this second possible strategy, the autonomous intersection uses its available
sensors to detect the presence of the hazard. Next it approximates the size of the
hazard. Following this information gathering, the intersection determines which paths
are obstructed by the rogue vehicle. For example, all traffic from the northbound right
lane, eastbound traffic in the right lane, and eastbound traffic from the right side
southbound lane are obstructed with the rogue vehicle located such as in Figure 15.
Once all obstructed lanes are determined, the autonomous intersection broadcasts the
warning message to all autonomous vehicles within range. The autonomous vehicles
use the list of obstructed lanes to determine if its path is safe. If the autonomous
vehicle’s path is not safe, then for simplicity sake it stops. This behavior ensures the
safety of the autonomous vehicle, the rogue vehicle, and their occupants. Figure 17
demonstrates this mitigation strategy allowing two autonomous vehicles with non-
obstructed paths to pass through the intersection. The arrows are added to clarify
the direction of the autonomous vehicles. Also notice the reservation tiles highlighted
under the rogue vehicle. This strategy enforces the reservation scheme even for the
non-autonomous vehicle.
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Figure 17. Mitigation in action allowing passage to non-obstructed autonomous vehicles
3.7.3 Expected Results.
Lacking the mitigation policy in place, the expected behavior is that autonomous
vehicles collide with the rogue vehicle. Given the assumption that lane changes are
not allowed, the expected behavior with mitigation is straight forward. One can ana-
lytically determine which paths are obstructed and which are not. For the paths that
are not obstructed, the total average delay should be unchanged, or even decreased.
However, the first autonomous vehicle that is unable to pass through the intersection
from a given lane blocks all subsequent autonomous vehicles in said lane. For exam-
ple, referring to Figure 17, an eastbound vehicle in the right lane turning right has
a clear path. However, if that vehicle is behind another vehicle going straight, the
second vehicle is unable to complete its path because lane changing is not available.
More complex mitigation techniques, such as lane changes, are out of scope for this
thesis.
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3.8 Scenario 2: Sybil Attack
Another instance of misbehavior that can be studied in this synthetic environment
is the Sybil attack [26]. This scenario portrays a simple Sybil attack taking place at
a single autonomous intersection using a number of different strategies. Consider an
autonomous vehicle controlled by a malicious actor herein referred to as the Sybil
attacker. A Sybil attacker’s motives may include:
1. Nuisance: Imposing delays on commuters to cause inconveniences.
2. Herding: Considering multiple intersections over a large area, such an attack
may herd vehicles in a given direction.
3. Carjacking: With sufficient delays, vehicles necessarily stop within roadways.
This type attack may cause commuters to be more susceptible to crimes such
as carjacking.
See Figure 18 for a possible positioning of a Sybil attacker in the synthetic envi-
ronment. The Sybil attacker carries out this attack with the following goals:
• Carry out the attack with the least cost possible
– Minimize network traffic (reservation requests)
– Minimize faulty identities used (VINs)
• Cause disruption for legitimate autonomous vehicles at the intersection in terms
of increased delay
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Figure 18. Sybil attacker shown on shoulder making false reservation requests
In order to minimize network traffic, the Sybil attacker may investigate possible
reservations to fabricate. For instance, from each lane, one could proceed straight or
turn one of two directions. Therefore, from each travel lane there are three possible
paths. In a four lane highway autonomous intersection (see Figure 19), there are 24
possible paths for which to make reservations (i.e. 3 paths/lane × 8 lanes = 24
paths).
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Figure 19. Legal turn direction options from a single lane with lane numbers
Consider the northbound left turn beginning in lane 0 and terminating into lane 3
shown in Figure 19. This reservation path will obstruct 19 of the 24 possible paths at
some point in time. (Table 7 provides the number of obstructed paths possible given
a particular path with Appendix A showing a detailed matrix showing which paths
obstruct with each other.) Note that two overlapping paths do not necessarily mean
a collision between vehicles. In the matrix in the appendix, an “x” denotes two paths
that may intersect, or obstruct, at some point while an “o” denotes two paths that
cannot conflict at all. Lanes 0 through 3 are outside lanes, while lanes 4 through 7 are
inside lanes. All outside lanes hold the same number of total obstructing paths while
all inside lanes respectively do the same. A Sybil attacker would be most interested
in the maximum effect with the least amount of effort. Therefore, the attack may
choose as few as two turns, namely left turns from lanes 0 and 3. Using these two
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lanes, all paths within the intersection are blocked. Note that an “x” appears in all
columns given the rows in lane 0 and 3 corresponding to left turns.
Table 7. Collision matrix for four-lane autonomous intersection
Lane Turn* Total**
0
L 19
S 15
R 5
1
L 19
S 15
R 5
2
L 19
S 15
R 5
3
L 19
S 15
R 5
4
L 14
S 15
R 9
5
L 14
S 15
R 9
6
L 14
S 15
R 9
7
L 14
S 15
R 9
*L = left turn, S = straight (no turn), R = right turn
**Number of obstructed paths
Next, consider how the Sybil attacker may request reservations using these two
turning directions to maximize the effects. The Sybil attacker does not want to make
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requests to the autonomous intersection that the attacker knows will be denied since
that would increase unneeded network traffic.
3.8.1 Sybil Attacker Approach - Serial Reservations.
This approach demonstrates the attacker making a single reservation within the
intersection at a time. In other words, at any given moment, the attacker only holds a
single confirmed reservation. There are multiple reservations, however, they are serial
in nature since only one reservation is active within the intersection at any moment.
To disrupt traffic as much as possible with this approach, the arrival and departure
times have to be considered. These times are directly related to the velocity within the
intersection. With low speeds used by the attacker, it is possible to have a legitimate
reservation granted that allows a vehicle to cross the Sybil attacker’s paths. For
instance, consider a right turn from southbound lane 2 to eastbound lane 3. Despite
the reservation for the Sybil attacker being made for a left turn from lane 0 to 3,
the southbound legitimate vehicle is still able to proceed, possibly without delay
depending on its arrival time. Thus, the arrival time and departure time must be
close together for the attacker’s request, i.e. the velocity within the intersection must
be increased, to require a denial to legitimate vehicles.
The first experiment’s setup includes reservation requests for left turns from lane
0 to lane 3 by the attacker. These reservations are made with the arrival times and
departure times reflecting a high velocity. The second experiment’s setup is extend
the previous setup with left turns from lane 3 to lane 2. Reservation requests are sent
in an alternating fashion to keep the serial nature of the reservations in tact.
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3.8.2 Sybil Attacker Approach - Parallel Reservations.
An attacker may not be able to make successful reservations with high velocities
within the intersection due to defenses in place by the autonomous intersection. In-
troduced in this approach is the concept of parallel, or simultaneous, reservations.
Rather than a single reservation at a time as in the previous approach, the attacker
is able to make multiple non-conflicting reservation requests. The resulting parallel
reservations reflect a platoon of closely spaced vehicles traveling at the appropriate
speed through the intersection, however, none actually exits.
This approach demonstrates the attacker’s ability to request several reservations
within the intersection at a time. Reservations must be timed such that each of them
does not conflict with another. Subsequent requests have to be delayed enough to not
provide enough space for legitimate drivers’ reservation requests. If the attacker makes
two requests that start at the same time, the second request is necessarily denied by
the autonomous intersection due to the safety violation of the reservations overlapping
within the intersection. The attacker must delay the subsequent reservation requests
enough to be granted the reservations.
The first experiment’s setup includes reservation requests for left turns from lane
0 to 3 by the attacker. The reservations are made such that there is less than one
vehicle’s length between reservations. The reservations resemble those in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. Parallel reservations from lane 0 to lane 3 made by Sybil attacker
The second experiment’s setup extends the previous setup with left turns from
lane 3 to lane 2 (see Figure 21). These reservations are sent in an alternating fashion
maintaining the parallel nature of the reservations. The space between each reser-
vation in a particular path needs to be adjusted appropriately in order to weave the
alternating reservation paths together. Each reservation request is made in such a
way that the paths are close without overlapping. Recall the attacker intends to not
get rejections for reservation request.
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Figure 21. Alternating parallel reservations made by Sybil attacker
3.8.3 Mitigations.
The main problems exemplified by this scenario are those of spoofing identities
and requesting reservations with characteristics that should not be allowed. It follows
that an update in the autonomous intersection policies will suffice. In the event of
one of the Sybil-type attacks previously described, a traffic intersection unwittingly
accepts reservations that should never be fulfilled since they are not coming from
legitimate vehicles. The intersection also unwittingly denies legitimate users’ reserva-
tion requests, therefore queuing any vehicle whose requested reservation conflict with
the Sybil attack. Also affected are any vehicles behind the queued vehicles regardless
of their intended direction of travel through the intersection.
The first mitigation technique is to only allow reservations up to a fixed time in the
future. Without this mitigation technique, the attacker is able to preemptively request
reservations far in advance. Since these reservations are made so far in advance, when
a legitimate vehicle finally arrives within range of an intersection, the reservation
request based on its estimated time of arrival derived from its current speed will have
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already been taken by the attacker. This technique, however, does not guarantee
that the attacker does not continue to disrupt the flow of traffic. Since the attacker
is constantly making reservations with spoofed identifications, there exists a race
condition for the times furthest in the future. If a legitimate user secures one of these
later reservations, then it will likely have to slow down, causing significant delay
depending on the latest available time to enter the intersection.
To mitigate the reservations made in the serial reservations approach, the inter-
section could update its policy to not allow for high speeds within the intersection.
Establishing a check for a minimum amount of time spent within the intersection
will directly mitigate the high speed reservation requests. The high speed reservation
requests used will be rejected. In fact, all reservation requests will be rejected when
exceeding the maximum velocity allowed within the intersection. Each of the serial
reservations experiments will be executed using this mitigation strategy.
Offered here are two techniques to tackle the issue of spoofing identities. First,
each vehicle’s messages could contain a unique signed certificate by a third party,
thereby increasing the difficulty of the Sybil attack. The autonomous intersection
will then be able to verify the validity of the vehicle’s certificate. If the certificate
is not legitimate, then the reservation request is denied. This approach is easily
abstracted in the synthetic environment by maintaining a list of valid autonomous
vehicle VINs. Each time a reservation request is made, the intersection manager
simply has to see if the VIN matches to any of the valid VINs.
A second, more elaborate mitigation technique to combat spoofing identities re-
quires the incorporation of sensor data collected by the intersection. Giving the
autonomous intersection the ability to detect vehicles approaching and record the
approaching vehicles’ identifiers, then a match between the requested reservation and
the sensors’ collected data could be used to verify the request prior to granting the
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requests. When a reservation request arrives at the autonomous intersection, the in-
tersection would compare the arrival time in the message with the estimated arrival
time from the sensors of that particular vehicle. If there is a mismatch in the arrival
times, or the vehicle is not found, then the intersection could refuse the reservation
request. This mitigation technique would require a network of sensors able to detect
the vehicles and their identifiers, however, it would mitigate the presented Sybil at-
tack. There is a possibility of hacking the network of sensors which would involve
attacks beyond the presented Sybil attack scenario’s scope.
The mitigations used in the synthetic environment is a combination of the policy
updates and using certificates to verify valid users via a list of legitimate VINs. This
ensures legitimate autonomous vehicles do not exceed the intersection’s maximum
velocity as well.
3.8.4 Expected Results.
Considering no mitigation strategy, a Sybil attacker would be able to forge nu-
merous VINs in order to make false reservation requests. These requests would be
granted without proper defenses in place by the intersection. Depending on the false
reservations made, some or all autonomous vehicles would be affected. The effects
could either be increased delay or inability to get a reservation at all. This instance
of misbehavior, left unmitigated, does not result in a safety concern. However, it does
present a special kind of denial of service (DoS), denying reservations to legitimate
users while maintaining connectivity.
Within the serial reservation Sybil attack approaches, traffic from all directions
is expected to come to a complete halt at some point. As soon as the leading au-
tonomous vehicle in each lane is denied its reservation request by the intersection,
then all vehicles in that lane are stopped. This will happen immediately in the second
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serial reservation experiment since the two alternating left turns block all lanes’ paths
through the intersection.
The parallel reservations Sybil attack approach is a little bit more interesting.
The first experiment only uses left turns from lane 0. The results of this experiment
is expected to be the same as the results of the first during the serial reservations
Sybil attack. At some point, all directions of travel will be blocked. In the experiment
where two left turns are alternated between lane 0 and lane 3, the reservations must be
separated enough to ensure the reservations will not be rejected. Given the spacing of
reservations, vehicles taking certain paths will be able to attain reservations. Consider
a right turn from lane 1. It is expected that this right turn would be reserved given
the space between the Sybil attacker’s requests. The final steady state of stopped
traffic in every lane is expected, however, not as quickly as the other experiments.
When the mitigation strategies are in place though, the attacker should have no
effect on the delay experienced by the legitimate autonomous vehicles. The mitiga-
tion strategy used to defend against the serial reservations (maximum velocity within
intersection) should show to be ineffective with the parallel reservations. The mitiga-
tion strategy used in the parallel reservations attack should work in both approaches
since it is checking identities rather than intersection velocities.
3.9 Scenario 3: Squatter Attack
In this instance of misbehavior, a legitimate autonomous vehicle fabricates a cus-
tom atypical reservation request. This custom reservation request allows for the
misbehaving autonomous vehicle to come to a complete stop for a given period of
time inside the intersection. At some point, the vehicle leaves the intersection, all
while being compliant with its requested and confirmed reservation.
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3.9.1 Squatter Approach.
An autonomous vehicle with an occupant with the intent to inject misbehavior,
known as the squatter, approaches an autonomous intersection. The squatter fab-
ricates a custom reservation request. Within this request, he proposes to come to
a complete stop within the intersection. Unlike the typical reservation request, this
request has an arrival time as usual, however, the reservation has him coming to a
complete stop in the center of the intersection, and then continue on. This unique
reservation request is sent to the autonomous intersection and the reply is sent. The
autonomous vehicle receives a confirmation message so long as the requested reserva-
tion does not conflict with other confirmed reservations. The vehicle is now able to
enter the intersection and come to a complete stop in the middle of the intersection
(or wherever the custom reservation placed the stopping point).
Within the synthetic environment, the squatter attempts to stop within the in-
tersection for approximately 180 seconds in simulation. The squatter stops at the
middle point in its path through the intersection. Three separate paths are used
to validate the expected behavior of the autonomous intersection. The squatter is
headed northbound in lane number 1 (inside lane) and have 3 different paths: left
turn, straight, and right turn. Each path taken is studied at the 3 traffic levels of
100, 200, and 300 vehicles generated per hour per lane.
The first generated vehicle in each generation schedule is modified to fit the squat-
ter profile described above. Also, since the squatter’s goal is to cause delays from
within the intersection, only the first generated car is assigned the squatter role.
3.9.2 Mitigation.
The mitigation for this type of misbehavior is similar to that of the Sybil attack
scenario. The autonomous intersection’s reservation policy requires an update. This
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update differs from that of the Sybil attack, since it is quite the opposite. Rather
than requiring the proposed reservations to have a maximum acceptable velocity, this
policy would require a maximum acceptable amount of time within the intersection
or a minimum acceptable velocity.
The policy checks each request to ensure the amount of time between the arrival
and departure times is reasonable. In the case of the squatter attack, any stopping
within the intersection quickly adds to the amount of time spent within the intersec-
tion. Within the synthetic environment, the autonomous intersection checks to ensure
the amount of time requested does not exceed the time needed to pass through the
intersection at a given velocity. The speed limit within the intersection is set to be 8
meters per second.
3.9.3 Expected Results.
The autonomous vehicle squatter attack, without mitigation, causes increased
delays. Since the squatter requested, and was granted, a legitimate reservation made
prior to its arrival, there is no safety concern since no conflicting reservations would
have been made. However, there will still be the issue of increased delays while this
misbehavior is taking place. Considering lanes and paths affected by the squatter,
the average delays will be greater than without the squatter. However, lanes with
paths which are not affected by the squatter will experience no additional delay. Also,
for the unaffected lanes and paths, the average delay may decrease due to the lower
amount of traffic competing for the same time-space within the intersection.
With the mitigation in place, the overall average delays per lane and total should
be unchanged when compared to the baseline scenarios. This is expected since the
mitigation eliminates the squatter’s attack completely.
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3.10 Human Control in a Fully Automated Environment
Other modifications to the AIM protocol have been made to accommodate human
control. However, when humans maintain control of the vehicle in these protocols,
the intersection reverts to traditional traffic signals to communicate with the human-
controlled traffic. Each of the modified versions of AIM discussed in section 2.4 do not
allow the human to persistently maintain control of the vehicle while also removing
the need for the traditional traffic light.
Can humans safely maintain control at all times when traveling through a fully
autonomous intersection? A fully autonomous intersection does not use traditional
traffic signals in normal operation. Backup traffic signals may be in place for emer-
gency and/or failure situations. The synthetic environment is the only reasonable
place to test such modification to a reservation-based protocol for to many reasons
including safety.
Incorporating the ability of a human to maintain control of a semi-autonomous
vehicle while navigating an intersection without traditional signals is not trivial. In
addition to the traditional controls such as an accelerator, brake pedal, steering wheel,
turn signals, mirrors, and speedometer (to only list a few), there must be some addi-
tional controls and/or displays available to accommodate human control through an
autonomous intersection. Described below are these additional controls and displays
that are required.
Currently, traditional road signs communicate to drivers information about up-
coming hazards and changes in traffic patterns such as sharp bends, speed limits,
and intersections. An in-dash indicator to notify the human of an intersection that
has come into range would be needed. In addition to this indicator, a button could
be used to initiate communication with the autonomous intersection [16]. Once this
button is pressed, the vehicle then communicates with the intersection to arrange
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a reservation for passage, initiating the messaging flow starting in the autonomous
vehicle entity in Figure 5 (see above).
During times of congestion, the reservation request sent may be denied. In this
scenario, there is a requirement to inform the driver of this fact. For simplicity, any
denial of a reservation requires the driver to slow the vehicle. At this point, the driver
may press the button again or the vehicle may make another request automatically.
This could continue until a point is reached prior to entering the intersection until a
reservation is successful.
Once a reservation is successful, this information is fed back to the vehicle and
needs to be displayed to the driver. An indicator would show that a reservation is
made for the desired path as well as the velocity to maintain while inside the intersec-
tion. The confirmed reservation presents the need for a mechanism to communicate
to the driver the goal velocity to arrive at the required time and/or the velocity
required to travel within the intersection. This feedback is pivotal in ensuring the
human-controlled vehicle arrives and passes through the intersection at the correct
time. It must be able to constantly update the goal velocity based on the current
time, arrival time, and distance to the intersection. This indicator may also be used
to communicate the goal velocity while within the intersection.
Finally, independent of the velocity of the vehicle, the human must be able to
maintain the correct lateral control of the vehicle, especially within the intersection.
This path maintainer feedback indicator would notify the driver if the vehicle is too
far left or right from the center of the current lane and also the dictated path through
the intersection.
Table 8 shows a summary list of the possible controls and feedback devices dis-
cussed. The manner at which these devices are displayed to the driver are discussed
in section 4.3.
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Table 8. Human controls and feedback devices required for persistent human control
Item Description
In-Range Indicator A device that informs the driver of an autonomous
intersection within range.
Request Reservation Button A device that initiates V2X communication to re-
quest a reservation from the intersection.
Denied Reservation Indicator A device which warns a driver that the requested
reservation is denied.
Granted Reservation Indicator A device which confirms to the driver a reservation
is successful and the assigned velocity while within
the intersection.
Goal Velocity Indicator An active device which informs the driver of the re-
quired velocity to maintain to meet keep the reser-
vation. May also be used to maintain the correct
velocity within the intersection.
Maintain Path Indicator An active feedback device which informs the driver
of the left/right position correctness based on the
lane or planned path within the intersection.
Armed with these controls and feedback devices, the human may now be able
to safely enter the fully autonomous intersection. The synthetic environment is the
best place to test the ability of the human to safely pass through the autonomous
intersection due to obvious safety concerns.
64
IV. Analysis
This chapter presents the analysis results from the experiments executed for the
verification and validation of the synthetic environment. The first section discusses
the baseline scenarios which were used to establish the viability of the synthetic envi-
ronment’s capability to manage an autonomous intersection. Next, the misbehavior
scenarios and are discussed in detail along with the persistent human control obser-
vations made.
4.1 Verification
This section describes the analysis of the baseline scenarios. These scenarios
show that the synthetic environment’s autonomous control management system func-
tions properly and is a viable intersection management system. To establish the au-
tonomous intersection’s legitimacy in the synthetic environment, three scenarios were
executed with five separate trials for each scenario. To consider the autonomous in-
tersection management system viable, the dependent variables of average delay and
number of collisions were considered. These variables have two conditions that must
be met. First, there must be no physical collisions between any two autonomous
vehicles. Second, there must not be a significant difference between the average de-
lays between the Autonomous Intersection Management (AIM) Simulator and the
synthetic environment’s autonomous intersection manager.
To show there is no significant difference between the mean delays, a two sample
z-test is run for each trial in each scenario since the sample sizes are large. The null
hypothesis for each test is that there is no difference, while the alternate hypothesis
in this two-tailed test is that there is a difference in the mean delays. If, for any
test, the p-value is less than α = 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning
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that there is statistical evidence to suggest there is a difference in the mean delays
between the AIM Simulator and the synthetic environment.
The first scenario set the traffic volume at 100 cars generated per lane per hour.
Each of the five trials for this experiment were executed for a total time of 30 minutes,
or 1,800 seconds, in simulation time.
4.1.1 Baseline Results.
Each scenario is executed with all five trials running concurrently in five separate
instances of the synthetic environment. Tables 9, 10, and 11 show the results from
the baseline scenarios 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Figures 22, 23, and 24 show the
comparison between the average delays between the AIM Simulator and the synthetic
environment. The circles and the plus signs on the graphs represent the total average
delay experienced by the autonomous vehicles in the AIM Simulator and the synthetic
environment, respectively.
Table 9. Baseline scenario 1 results
Response Variable Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5
AIM Simulator Output
Throughput 404 380 394 380 392
Average Delay (s) 0.16 0.1648 0.1562 0.1568 0.1418
Standard Deviation (s) 0.26 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.52
Maximum Delay (s) 3.94 5.86 6.24 6.02 3.94
Collisions 0 0 0 0 0
Synthetic Environment Output
Throughput 404 381 394 381 393
Average Delay (s) 0.1846 0.1503 0.1579 0.1933 0.1449
Standard Deviation (s) 0.65 0.50 0.50 0.77 0.44
Maximum Delay (s) 7.59 5.05 4.78 9.99 4.51
Collisions 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 10. Baseline scenario 2 results
Response Variable Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5
AIM Simulator Output
Throughput 703 722 711 640 681
Average Delay (s) 0.3846 0.3767 0.3690 0.2601 0.2764
Standard Deviation (s) 1.23 1.04 0.97 0.80 0.82
Maximum Delay (s) 14.56 9.06 7.26 6.84 5.98
Collisions 0 0 0 0 0
Synthetic Environment Output
Throughput 705 726 715 640 688
Average Delay (s) 0.3327 0.3818 0.2813 0.3152 0.3048
Standard Deviation (s) 1.07 1.15 0.73 1.00 0.95
Maximum Delay (s) 9.59 11.40 6.66 12.48 9.80
Collisions 0 0 0 0 0
Table 11. Baseline scenario 3 results
Response Variable Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5
AIM Simulator Output
Throughput 935 935 929 932 957
Average Delay (s) 0.6619 0.5724 0.5479 0.6420 0.6019
Standard Deviation (s) 1.73 1.45 1.41 1.68 1.67
Maximum Delay (s) 16.62 12.28 16.06 17.56 16.64
Collisions 0 0 0 0 0
Synthetic Environment Output
Throughput 937 939 933 933 957
Average Delay (s) 0.5698 0.6905 0.5334 0.6782 0.5298
Standard Deviation (s) 1.55 2.20 1.55 2.50 1.64
Maximum Delay (s) 14.62 31.77 18.59 43.91 17.12
Collisions 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 22. Average delay observed in Simulation 1
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Figure 23. Average delay observed in Simulation 2
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Figure 24. Average delay observed in Simulation 3
4.1.2 Baseline Analysis.
The two sample z-tests results from each of the scenarios are in Table 12. The
p-values are all greater than or equal to the significance level of α = 0.05. This
gives statistical evidence to support that the total average delays between the AIM
Simulator and the synthetic environment do not differ with strong statistical evidence.
With this establishment of the viability of the synthetic environment, it can be used
to conduct further experiments. These experiments are conducted without comparing
the delays from the AIM Simulator since it is not able to be used to introduce any sort
of misbehavior or cyber attack scenario. These experiments are also used to validate
the expected behavior of the synthetic environment.
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Table 12. Results analysis for all baseline scenarios
Scenario 1
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5
AIM* Average Delay (s) 0.16 0.1648 0.1562 0.1568 0.1418
AIM Standard Deviation (s) 0.26 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.52
SE** Average Delay (s) 0.1846 0.1503 0.1579 0.1933 0.1449
SE Standard Deviation (s) 0.65 0.50 0.50 0.77 0.44
Two-tailed z-test p-value 0.55 0.73 0.97 0.47 0.93
Scenario 2
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5
AIM Average Delay (s) 0.3846 0.3767 0.3690 0.2601 0.2764
AIM Standard Deviation (s) 1.23 1.04 0.97 0.80 0.82
SE Average Delay (s) 0.3327 0.3818 0.2813 0.3152 0.3048
SE Standard Deviation (s) 1.07 1.15 0.73 1.00 0.95
Two-tailed z-test p-value 0.40 0.93 0.05 0.28 0.55
Scenario 3
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5
AIM Average Delay (s) 0.6619 0.5724 0.5479 0.6420 0.6019
AIM Standard Deviation (s) 1.73 1.45 1.41 1.68 1.67
SE Average Delay (s) 0.5698 0.6905 0.5334 0.6782 0.5298
SE Standard Deviation (s) 1.55 2.20 1.55 2.50 1.64
Two-tailed z-test p-value 0.23 0.17 0.83 0.71 0.34
*AIM = AIM Simulator
**SE = Synthetic Environment
4.2 Validation
This section discusses the results obtained from running the validation scenarios.
These scenarios introduce a number of different misbehaviors into the synthetic envi-
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ronment. As discussed previously, these misbehaviors cannot be modeled in the AIM
Simulator.
4.2.1 Rogue non-Autonomous Vehicle.
The experiments run in this misbehavior scenario were executed without the mit-
igating techniques in place. The first autonomous vehicle whose path was obstructed
by the rogue vehicle collided with it. This result was expected due to the intersection
having no ability to locate and account for the presence of the rogue vehicle.
Using the mitigation technique discussed in section 3.7.2, the autonomous vehicles
were informed to not approach the intersection. The broadcast warning to each of
the autonomous vehicles contained which starting lanes and turning directions that
are unsafe for passage. Additionally, when an autonomous vehicle is queued behind
another vehicle who is blocked by the rogue vehicle, the trailing vehicle is notified
that the leading vehicle is blocked by a rogue vehicle. This is important in that the
trailing vehicle’s path may not be obstructed, however, since the trailing vehicle is
queued behind one that is, then it is also blocked indirectly by the rogue vehicle.
Each experiment below consists of three separate traffic volume levels. The first
trial’s generation schedule from each of the scenarios in the baseline experiment were
used to conduct the experiments. The traffic volumes used here are 100, 200, and 300
vehicles per hour per lane.
4.2.1.1 Rogue Vehicle Location: Center.
The location of the rogue vehicle in this experiment blocks at least one path from
every approaching lane. In Figure 25, the mitigation strategy is in place, stopping
vehicles which have an obstructed path by the rogue vehicle. Also, it was observed
that the vehicles approaching which are able to pass still may, provided they are
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not queued behind another vehicle being denied passage. Note the rogue vehicle’s
reservation is showing in the figure while the other autonomous vehicle is passing
through the intersection. This shows that the intersection is able to locate the vehicle
accurately. Each new reservation request is made with this rogue vehicle’s reservation
set.
Figure 25. Queues formed during successful rogue vehicle misbehavior mitigation
Once the experiment reaches a steady state, all directions are queued and all
approaching vehicles are stopped. This steady state gridlock occurred within a few
minutes into the simulation. This is the expected behavior given that at some point,
all starting lanes have a possible path that is obstructed by the rogue vehicle. Once
an autonomous vehicle is stopped in a given lane, all traffic behind it is stopped as
well. This steady state level of gridlock can be seen in Figure 26. This figure shows
the southbound and westbound lanes. Table 13 shows the total vehicles generated,
throughput, and delay for this experiment. (Note if no vehicles pass through an
intersection from a given lane, then the delay is listed as not applicable (N/A) due to
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the way delay is calculated (see Section 3.5.3.) Recall that the total vehicles generated
per lane is low due to the queues forming.
Figure 26. Approaching lanes stopped by rogue vehicle in center of intersection using
misbehavior mitigation
Table 13. Results of rogue vehicle in center of intersection with mitigation
100 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 13 10 14 8 8
Throughput 0 0 0 5 2 6 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A 0.01 0 0 N/A N/A
200 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 8 8 8 15 23 11 8 8
Throughput 0 0 0 8 15 3 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A 0 0.08 0 N/A N/A
300 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 11 7 12 8 8 10 9
Throughput 0 3 0 4 0 0 2 1
Delay (s) N/A 0 N/A 0.01 N/A N/A -0.01 1.33
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
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4.2.1.2 Rogue Vehicle Location: Northbound Outside Lane.
This experiment showed that the expected results for the rogue vehicle placement
in the southern portion of the northbound outside lane of the intersection were at-
tained. Since the rogue vehicle is placed in such a way in the intersection, some
approaching lanes, no matter the path taken, were unobstructed. However, as soon
as the first vehicle approaches with an obstructed path, all vehicles behind it are
queued up behind it. Figure 27 shows the steady state behavior of the intersection
with the rogue vehicle mitigation in action. Both northbound lanes are blocked since
the vehicle in the inside lane is not able to take a right turn to the east. These
are the expected results given the placement of the rogue vehicle. Table 14 shows
the expected results attained. The steady state gridlock, for the lanes that become
blocked, was achieved within the first few minutes of simulation.
Figure 27. Steady state reached with rogue vehicle in northbound lane with misbehavior
mitigation
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Table 14. Results of rogue vehicle in northbound lane of intersection with mitigation
100 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 11 7 57 13 37 8 56 55
Throughput 3 0 55 5 37 1 54 54
Delay (s) 0 N/A 0.08 0.01 0.39 0 0.10 0.05
200 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 9 7 81 15 86 8 90 88
Throughput 1 0 79 8 85 0 88 85
Delay (s) 0 N/A 0.24 0 0.11 N/A 0.17 0.04
300 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 11 7 119 12 127 9 132 116
Throughput 3 0 116 4 124 2 129 114
Delay (s) 0.01 N/A 0.41 0.58 0.20 -0.01 0.15 0.07
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
4.2.1.3 Rogue Vehicle Location: Southeast Quadrant.
This experiment showed that the expected results for the rogue vehicle placement
in the southeast quadrant of the intersection were attained. Similar to the previous
placement of the rogue vehicle, some approaching lanes no matter the path taken were
unobstructed. However, as soon as the first vehicle approaches with an obstructed
path, all vehicles behind it are queued up behind it. Figure 28 shows the steady
state behavior of the intersection with mitigation. The northbound and eastbound
lanes were completely blocked while the westbound lanes were unobstructed. The
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southbound inside lane was not block as well. These are the expected results given
the placement of the rogue vehicle. Table 15 shows the expected results after reaching
the steady state gridlock within a few minutes in simulation.
Figure 28. Steady state gridlock with rogue vehicle in southeast quadrant with misbe-
havior mitigation
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Table 15. Results of rogue vehicle in southeast quadrant of intersection with mitigation
100 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 8 7 57 13 10 8 9 55
Throughput 0 0 55 5 2 1 1 54
Delay (s) N/A N/A 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 0.03
200 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 8 7 81 15 23 8 13 88
Throughput 1 0 79 8 15 0 5 85
Delay (s) 0 N/A 0.18 0 0.16 N/A 0.39 0.03
300 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 8 7 119 12 8 9 11 116
Throughput 0 0 116 4 0 2 4 114
Delay (s) N/A N/A 0.14 0.58 N/A -0.01 0.44 0.04
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
4.2.1.4 Rogue Vehicle Conclusion.
These experiments validated the expected behavior of the synthetic environment
given this type of misbehavior and mitigation strategy. Three different rogue vehicle
positions along with three different traffic levels each were used in the experiments.
The synthetic environment produced results that are in line with the expectations.
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4.2.2 Sybil Attack.
The Sybil attacker in this research is a malicious actor with the ability to pose as
multiple false identities. The identities used here are the autonomous vehicles’ vehicle
identification numbers (VINs). The Sybil attacker uses two approaches to cause
disruption at the intersection. First, the attacker sends a series of reservation request,
each of which do not overlap in the time domain. That is, each confirmed reservation’s
arrival time is after the previous reservation’s departure time. This approach is called
the serial reservations approach. Secondly, the attacker sends a chain of reservation
requests, each of which may overlap with previous or subsequent reservation requests.
Since these reservations overlap in the time domain, this approach is called the parallel
reservations approach. In each of the approaches and experiments, the attacker is
stationary just south of the intersection on the northbound shoulder.
The vehicle generation schedule used in each of the experiments is that of the
baseline scenario 1, trial 1. This generation schedule generates approximately 100
vehicles per lane per hour randomly.
4.2.2.1 Serial Reservations.
The first experiment executed in this approach had the attacker make many high
velocity reservation requests to the intersection. These requests for a left turn from
lane 0 were all granted. The upper half of Table 16 shows the expected results of
this experiment without the mitigation in place. After the first vehicles traveling
eastbound, the traffic from that direction stopped due to the attack.
The purpose of this experiment was to show the expected overall behavior of
queues formed in all directions where paths intersect with the attacker’s requests.
Figure 29 shows the queues formed. All lanes were stopped at approximately 100
seconds into the simulation. Each of the eastbound lanes had one vehicle pass through
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the intersection before the queues formed for those lanes. These vehicles turned right
into the northbound lane unobstructed.
Figure 29. Queues formed during successful Sybil attack
The second experiment in this approach had the attacker make many high speed
reservation requests to the intersections for two separate turn directions. These re-
quests for left turns from lane 0 and 3 were all granted. The lower half of Table
16 shows the expected results of this experiment attained without the mitigation in
place. No autonomous vehicles were able to pass through the intersection.
The expected behavior once again was attained. Since all paths from all directions
were obstructed by the attacker’s false reservations, queues began to form from all
directions, allowing no vehicles to pass through. The steady state of all directions
blocked is similar to that in Figure 29 from the previous experiment.
Table 16 shows the results for total throughput and delay for the experiment. The
experiment used the same vehicle generation schedule as that of the baseline scenario
1, trial 1 which generated 100 vehicles per lane per hour. The delays listed are those
of the specific lane of travel.
79
Table 16. Results of serial reservations in Sybil attack
Left turns from NO lane Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7
Throughput 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 -0.06 N/A N/A
Left turns from NO and WO lanes Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Throughput 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
Introducing the mitigation strategy of requiring a minimum amount of time within
the intersection successfully thwarts this type of attack. The attacker was at first
able to make multiple reservations with high velocities. Now that the intersection’s
policy is updated to automatically deny reservations at high velocities, this attack
is no longer able to be carried out. See Table 17 for the expected results of this
experiment. The two experiments had the same results due to the successful defense
against the serial reservation Sybil attack.
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Table 17. Results of serial reservations in Sybil attack using minimum time mitigation
Left turns from NO lane Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 51 54 57 54 37 47 56 55
Throughput 50 54 55 52 37 47 54 54
Delay (s) 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.54 0.22 0.12 0.07
Total Average Delay (s) 0.16
Left turns from NO and WO lanes Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 51 54 57 54 37 47 56 55
Throughput 50 54 55 52 37 47 54 54
Delay (s) 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.54 0.22 0.12 0.07
Total Average Delay (s) 0.16
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
4.2.2.2 Parallel Reservations.
The first experiment executed in this approach had the attacker make many nor-
mal velocity (8 meters per second) reservation requests to the intersection. The
requests were parallel, meaning that more than one reservation from the attacker
were confirmed at any given moment in time. See Figure 30 to see the parallel nature
of the reservations. These requests for a left turn from lane 0 were all granted. The
upper half of Table 18 shows the expected results of this experiment without the mit-
igation in place. After the first vehicles traveling eastbound in each lane, the traffic
from that direction stopped due to the attack. This is identical to the behavior in
the first experiment in the serial reservations approach.
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The purpose of this experiment was to show the expected overall behavior of
queues being formed in all directions where the paths intersect with the attacker’s
requests. Figure 30 shows the the queues formed. All lanes were stopped at approxi-
mately 100 seconds into the simulation. Each of the eastbound lanes had one vehicle
pass through the intersection before the queues formed from that direction. Each of
these vehicles turned right into the northbound lane unobstructed.
Figure 30. Queues formed as a result of parallel reservation Sybil attack
The second experiment in this approach had the attacker make many normal
velocity (8 meters per second) reservation requests to the intersections for two separate
turn directions. These requests for left turns form lane 0 and 3 were all granted. The
lower half of Table 18 shows the expected results of this experiment without the
mitigation in place. Three starting lanes were able to attain a non-zero throughput.
These lanes, however, did eventually experience gridlock when the first vehicle whose
path was obstructed by the attacker’s reservations was denied.
The expected behavior once again was attained. Since all paths from all directions
were obstructed by the attacker’s false reservations, queues began to form from all
directions, allowing no vehicles to pass through. The steady state the gridlock is
shown in Figure 31.
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Figure 31. Sybil attack using alternating weaved left turns
Table 18 shows the results for total throughput and delay for the experiments.
The experiments used the same generate schedule as that of the baseline scenario 1,
trial 1 which generated 100 vehicles per lane per hour.
Table 18. Results of parallel reservations in Sybil attack
Left turns from NO lane Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7
Throughput 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 -0.06 N/A N/A
Total Average Delay (s) -0.03
Left turns from NO and WO lanes Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 12 9 8 7 7
Throughput 0 0 0 5 2 1 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A 1.69 0.74 2.34 N/A N/A
Total Average Delay (s) 1.53
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
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Introducing the mitigation technique used in the serial reservation approach (en-
suring the reservation request does not use a high velocity within the intersection) is
not effective in this approach. Table 19 shows these expected results attained. The
results are identical to the experiment run without the mitigation in place. This is
the expected behavior since the velocity used to form the reservation requests is 8
meters per second, which passes the check used in the mitigation strategy.
Table 19. Results of parallel reservations in Sybil attack using minimum time mitigation
Left turns from NO lane Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7
Throughput 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 -0.06 N/A N/A
Total Average Delay (s) -0.03
Left turns from NO and WO lanes Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 7 7 7 12 9 8 7 7
Throughput 0 0 0 5 2 1 0 0
Delay (s) N/A N/A N/A 1.69 0.74 2.34 N/A N/A
Total Average Delay (s) 1.53
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
Using the mitigation technique of verifying the autonomous vehicle’s identity
proved to be successful in thwarting the Sybil attacker. The attacker relies heav-
ily on being able to fake identities, when this ability is taken away, the attack is no
longer valid. Table 20 shows the expected results attained. These results match that
of the baseline scenario 1, trial 1 where 100 vehicles per lane per hour are generated.
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Table 20. Results of parallel reservations in Sybil attack using VIN verification miti-
gation
Left turns from NO lane Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 51 54 57 54 37 47 56 55
Throughput 50 54 55 52 37 47 54 54
Delay (s) 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.54 0.22 0.12 0.07
Total Average Delay (s) 0.16
Left turns from NO and WO lanes Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 51 54 57 54 37 47 56 55
Throughput 50 54 55 52 37 47 54 54
Delay (s) 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.54 0.22 0.12 0.07
Total Average Delay (s) 0.16
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
4.2.2.3 Sybil Attack Scenario Conclusion.
The synthetic environment behaved as expected during the Sybil attack scenario.
The mitigation strategy which was designed to handle high velocity reservation re-
quests from the Sybil attacker was successful. However, the defense was shown to be
insufficient when the Sybil attacker did not use high speeds within the intersection.
Giving the intersection the ability to verify identities was shown to thwart the Sybil
attacker’s efforts to disrupt normal traffic reservations. Both approaches, the serial
reservation approach and the parallel reservation approach which used normal speeds
within the intersection, were successfully defended against.
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4.2.3 Squatter Attack.
For each of the squatter attack experiments, the squatter formulates a custom
reservation. The reservation contains a prolonged stay within the intersection. The
amount of time within the intersection, in addition to traveling to and from the
stopping point, is set to 3 minutes, or 180 seconds. The squatter stopped midway
through the intersection in each experiment as expected and stayed within its reserved
space.
4.2.3.1 Left Turn Path.
The first round of experiments placed the squatter in a left turn path. The
squatter came to a complete stop halfway through its turn, matching its reservation.
The vehicles whose paths are now obstructed are queued up, as shown in Figure 32.
The northbound outside lane is the only lane whose paths are not affected by the
squatter.
The results for this experiment are in Table 21. Note that each lane experienced
high average delays except for the northbound outside lane. This is to be expected
since no path is obstructed from this lane.
Figure 32. Left turning squatter occupies space in intersection
86
Table 21. Results of squatter turning left without mitigation
100 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 52 54 56 54 37 46 56 53
Throughput 51 54 54 52 37 46 54 52
Delay (s) 16.17 0.14 6.76 8.15 7.62 11.91 4.74 11.92
200 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 87 90 79 90 79 94 90 85
Throughput 86 88 77 89 78 93 88 82
Delay (s) 13.51 0.26 10.28 3.47 16.04 11.09 3.21 7.99
300 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 111 111 112 112 118 102 128 110
Throughput 107 108 109 109 115 99 125 108
Delay (s) 8.46 0.68 9.61 8.89 9.63 13.78 6.08 6.33
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
4.2.3.2 Straight Path.
The second round of experiments placed the squatter in a straight path inside
the intersection. The squatter stopped midway through the intersection as expected.
The traffic with conflicting reservations are denied and queues begin to form while
the squatter is stopped inside the intersection. Figure 33 shows the queues formed
while the squatter is occupying the middle of the intersection.
The results for this experiment are in Table 22. At least one path from every
direction is affected by this squatting location. This is evident by the increased
87
delays experienced by the vehicles in each lane. The low delays seen in the 100
and 200 vehicles per lane per hour charts for this experiment are an artifact of the
generation schedule. Since the generation schedule randomly selected which direction
to choose, these particular directions falsely show a low average delay. For instance,
if no vehicles were scheduled to turn left from the eastbound outside lane, then the
average delay for that lane would not be affected by the squatter since there would
be no paths blocked by the squatter in that situation.
Figure 33. Queues formed while squatter occupies space in intersection
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Table 22. Results of squatter traveling straight without mitigation
100 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 51 54 56 54 37 47 56 53
Throughput 50 54 54 52 37 47 54 52
Delay (s) 20.13 13.97 10.82 0.02 4.66 0.29 8.55 12.73
200 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 89 85 80 90 86 96 87 85
Throughput 88 83 78 89 85 95 85 82
Delay (s) 10.19 11.85 6.84 0.20 0.16 9.19 11.80 8.19
300 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 114 106 111 115 121 103 126 107
Throughput 110 103 108 112 118 100 123 105
Delay (s) 5.09 9.29 10.94 7.26 8.25 12.82 8.71 8.32
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
4.2.3.3 Right Turn Path.
Finally, the squatter’s path is a right turn. After stopping midway through the
intersection, as expected, conflicting traffic begins to queue. Figure 34 shows both
westbound lanes unaffected as well as the southbound inside lane at approximately
145 seconds into simulation. This is the expected behavior since no paths from these
lanes are obstructed by the squatter. Table 23 reflects the expected results as well
with increased delays on all but the lanes mentioned.
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Figure 34. Right turning squatter occupies space in intersection
Table 23. Results of squatter turning right without mitigation
100 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 51 54 56 54 37 46 56 55
Throughput 50 54 54 52 37 46 54 54
Delay (s) 17.65 13.57 0.10 0.11 3.98 11.86 0.12 0.07
200 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 89 85 81 90 86 94 90 88
Throughput 88 83 79 89 85 93 88 85
Delay (s) 11.23 10.08 0.34 0.20 0.17 10.12 0.37 0.42
300 vehicles/lane/hour Starting Lane*
NI NO SI SO EI EO WI WO
Total Generated 113 103 119 114 121 106 132 116
Throughput 109 100 116 111 118 103 129 114
Delay (s) 5.52 11.71 0.46 7.50 8.22 10.42 0.61 0.14
*{N, S, E, W} = {North, South, East, West}
{I, O} = {Inside Lane, Outside Lane}
Each of the squatter experiments return to normal experienced delays when the
mitigation strategy is enabled. Essentially each mitigation behaves identically to
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the baseline experiments discussed in section 4.1. Once the squatter is denied his
custom reservation, he resorts to requesting a normal reservation and is granted the
reservation.
4.3 Human Controls
This section discusses the preliminary observations made while testing the proto-
type protocol using the additional human control and feedback devices. The exper-
iments conducted are notional and serve as a proof of concept rather than human
subjects testing.
Figure 35 shows a sample screen shot of the synthetic environment. The black
rectangles in the lower left, lower right, and upper right mimic side view and rear
view mirrors. The remaining displays show some feedback information. On the left,
top to bottom, are: current simulation time (s), confirmed reservation’s arrival time
(s), current velocity (m/s), and goal velocity (m/s). In the upper center, a compass
displays one of eight cardinal or intercardinal headings (e.g., N, E, NE, etc.). On the
right, top to bottom are the current simulation name (used for reference purposes),
the reservation status, and a digital lateral offset mechanism.
The reservation status is a solid colored square located to the far right of the
display. The square is green when a reservation is confirmed by the intersection. The
square is yellow if no reservation is made while the vehicle is within range of the
intersection’s road side unit (RSU) and it turns red only if the vehicle does not have
a reservation and it is within the stopping distance to the intersection. The square is
black with the letters “N/A” when no intersection is within range.
In the center of the figure are two heads-up-displays (HUDs). They are each
made up of two translucent rectangles; one black and one green. The vertical black
rectangle, located just underneath of center screen, marks the desired center of the
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path taken by the vehicle. If the vehicle veers left of the correct path, the green
rectangle moves to the right of the vertical black rectangle. This indicates to the
human driver the vehicle needs to be positioned further right to be placed correctly.
The green rectangle turns red in the event the vehicle veers too far in any direction, left
or right, of the intended path. Similarly, the second HUD located left of center screen,
provides feedback to the human concerning the velocity of the vehicle. The horizontal
black rectangle and its corresponding green rectangle indicates to the driver whether
he/she should increase or decrease velocity. If the vehicle determines an increase in
velocity is necessary, the green dot slides upward (eventually turning red in warning).
Likewise, the green rectangle slides downward if the vehicle determines it needs to
slow down.
Figure 35. Screen shot of synthetic environment with human control
The design and placement of the feedback devices prove to be important. With
digital speedometer and goal speed indicator, having them close in proximity is im-
portant since they both contain information about velocity. Furthermore, an analog
display (common in traditional vehicles) may be more beneficial than a digital display.
An analog speedometer could have the goal velocity indicated in a separately colored
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dial overlaid on top of the current velocity dial. Drivers may prefer to have the option
of digital versus analog as well. Answers to these questions requires extensive testing.
Maintaining the center of the correct lane appears to be straight forward. However,
maintaining the correct position within the intersection proves to be more difficult
during turns. The path maintainer feedback device proves useful in maintaining the
proper latitudinal placement of the vehicle, but is largely reactive in nature. As a
proactive measure, as in many traditional larger intersections, turning lane marks
within the intersection may be useful.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the results and analysis from the experiments executed
for the verification and validation of the synthetic environment. The first section
discussed the baseline scenarios which were used to establish the ability of the syn-
thetic environment to manage autonomous vehicles within an autonomous intersec-
tion. Next, the misbehavior scenarios and were discussed in detail along with the
persistent human control observations made.
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V. Conclusions and Observations
This chapter explores the conclusions and observations drawn from the experi-
mental setup and analysis of the data collected in this research. Discussed here are
the verification and validation scenarios used to establish the reservation-based au-
tonomous intersection protocol within the synthetic environment. The chapter then
discusses the preliminary observations obtained from the introduction of persistent
human control in semi-autonomous vehicles. Finally, a future work section enumer-
ates several areas of interest for additional research.
5.1 Verification of Baseline Environment
The verification phase of development was intended to ensure the reservation-
based protocol meets the design requirements. The analysis shows that the protocol
used in the synthetic environment is roughly equivalent to the protocol used in the
Autonomous Intersection Management (AIM) Simulator developed by Dresner, given
the assumptions made in section 3.4 [3]. There were no safety violations at any point
during the outlined scenarios in section 3.6. The generated autonomous vehicles also
experienced comparable delays as outlined in section 4.1.2. With the successful com-
pletion of the baseline verification scenarios, the validation scenarios were executed.
5.2 Validation of Proposed Protocol
In the validation phase of development, the focus is on determining if the proto-
col produced expected results in scenarios unique to the synthetic environment. The
validation scenarios are outlined in sections 3.7 - 3.9 and the experimental results
from these scenarios are detailed in section 4.2. The results and analyses show that
the reservation-based autonomous intersection protocol operates as expected in the
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synthetic environment. The results of these validation scenarios reinforce the viabil-
ity of the reservation-based protocol as built. With the verification and validation
scenarios completed successfully, the introduction of the human controls is possible.
5.3 Introducing Human Controls
It was shown that, with the feedback mechanisms presented, a manually controlled
semi-autonomous vehicle may in fact safely approach, enter, traverse, and exit an
autonomous intersection with no traditional traffic control signals as demonstrated
in the developed synthetic environment. All control signals are communicated to
the vehicle via vehicle-to-anything (V2X) communications, allowing the protocol to
benefit from the increased efficiency of reservation-based protocols such as AIM.
5.4 Implications of Synthetic Environment
A synthetic environment able to host semi-autonomous vehicles has great promise
to cybersecurity research. With autonomous vehicles and semi-autonomous vehicles
communicating with infrastructure come unique cyber threats. Human-controlled or
otherwise, the ability of the vehicles and intersections to ensure the integrity and au-
thenticity of messages sent and received is vital because there are many cybersecurity
implications unique to semi-autonomous vehicles. The ability to defend against man-
in-the-middle attacks needs to be built in to the system. Sybil-type attacks could
cause increased delays where a malicious actor is making false reservation requests
and therefore delaying legitimate vehicles. Malicious software present on the vehicles
could misrepresent data to the human driver and cause the driver to arrive at the
intersection at the wrong speed, time, etc. Petit and Shladover enumerate a list of
potential cyber attacks unique to autonomous vehicles in [27]. Many of these attacks
involve controller area network (CAN) bus vulnerabilities.
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CAN cybersecurity is another area of research that the synthetic environment can
aid in exploring. It was shown that the AFTR Burner virtual world was able to
communicate with human controls via CAN traffic. CAN research could benefit from
the real-time realistic observations provided by the three-dimensional (3D) virtual
world.
Further development of the human feedback mechanisms can also be accomplished
within the synthetic environment. Determining the type and amount of feedback re-
quired, the best location for these mechanisms, and the manner in which a human
interacts with the semi-autonomous vehicle are all topics to which the synthetic en-
vironment is able to provide answers.
5.5 Research Contributions
Identifying and visualizing the cyber threats facing a reservation-based autonomous
intersection presented as validation scenarios are the subject of an accepted International
Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS) paper. This work was presented
at the 13th annual conference held in Washington, D.C.
A second paper was accepted for presentation at International Federation for In-
formation Processing (IFIP) working group (WG) 11.10 international conference on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). This second paper discussed the introduc-
tion of the persistent human control within the reservation-based intersection man-
agement protocol. It was presented at the 12th annual conference held in Arlington,
VA.
5.6 Future Work
The reservation-based protocol presented in this thesis is a proof of concept. There
are many aspects that need to be matured and further developed. Itemized below are
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some questions that need to be answered to implement a reliable, safe, and efficient
method for persistent human control:
• What is the minimum amount of information required for the driver to safely
maintain control of the vehicle?
• Should the current velocity and goal velocity be displayed separately in digital
format or together in an analog format?
• What is the optimal placement of these feedback devices?
Should the placement be the traditional in-dash location?
Should the placement be in a heads-up-device location in-line with the
driver’s view of the road?
• At what distance from the intersection should the vehicle assume control (if at
all)...
if the driver does not initiate communications using a manual button?
if the driver does not maintain the appropriate velocity?
if the driver does not maintain the appropriate path?
• What is the ideal safety buffer zone within an intersection for a human-controlled
vehicle considering both safety and efficiency?
• If the negative impact on efficiency is substantial, should there be geographical
zones and/or times where persistent human control is allowed?
• How should legacy vehicles be handled in such an environment?
Networking together several instances of the virtual world could add fidelity to a
more urban-like environment. The environment presented in this thesis consisted of
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a single intersection with many assumptions abstracting much of the V2X protocols.
Future work could be accomplished to integrate any number of virtual worlds which
could communicate in order to simulate a larger scale system. In addition, incorpo-
rating tools such as OMNeT++ would add fidelity to the wireless communications
between vehicles via V2X capabilities [28]. With this last addition, more realistic
experiments could be conducted to test the reservation-based protocol using actual
wireless V2X protocols.
Finally, introducing persistent human control has notionally been shown to be
feasible in the designed synthetic environment given the feedback mechanisms and
controls described. Additionally, the synthetic environment is highly configurable to
test many different aspects of the reservation-based autonomous intersection protocol
as well as the semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles modeled within it. The
future work topics proposed can each be studied and answered via the synthetic
environment well before the rubber meets the road.
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Appendix A. Collision Matrix
This matrix shows which paths within a four lane intersection obstruct each other. An “x” denotes a collision is possible,
while an “o” represents two paths where no collision is possible. This assumes vehicles follow the correct path within the
intersection.
Lane 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Turn* L S R L S R L S R L S R L S R L S R L S R L S R Total**
0
L x x x x x o x x x x x o o x x x x o x x x x x o 19
S x x x x x o x o o x x x o o x o x o x o o x x x 15
R x x x o x o x o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 5
1
L x x o x x x x x o x x x x x o o x x x x o x x x 19
S x x x x x x x x o x o o x x x o o x o x o x o o 15
R o o o x x x o x o x o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 5
2
L x x x x x o x x x x x o x x x x x o o x x x x o 19
S x o o x x x x x x x x o x o o x x x o o x o x o 15
R x o o o o o x x x o x o o o o o o o o o o o o o 5
3
L x x o x x x x x o x x x x x o x x x x x o o x x 19
S x x o x o o x x x x x x o x o x o o x x x o o x 15
R o x o x o o o o o x x x o o o o o o o o o o o o 5
4
L o o o x x o x x o x o o x x x x x o o x x x x o 14
S x o o x x o x o o x x o x x x x x o x o o x x x 15
R x x o o x o x o o o o o x x x o x o x o o o o o 9
5
L x o o o o o x x o x x o x x o x x x x x o o x x 14
S x x o x o o x x o x o o x x x x x x x x o x o o 15
R o o o x x o o x o x o o o o o x x x o x o x o o 9
6
L x x o x o o o o o x x o o x x x x o x x x x x o 14
S x o o x x o x o o x x o x o o x x x x x x x x o 15
R x o o o o o x x o o x o x o o o o o x x x o x o 9
7
L x x o x x o x o o o o o x x o o x x x x o x x x 14
S x x o x o o x x o x o o x x o x o o x x x x x x 15
R o x o x o o o o o x x o o x o x o o o o o x x x 9
*L = left turn, S = straight (no turn), R = right turn
**Number of obstructed paths
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